



## 18th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium and Exhibition

*“Warfare in the Seams:  
Defense and Industry Partnering to Win the Long War”*

Arlington, VA

26-28 February 2007

### Agenda

#### Monday, 26 February 2007

Military Services' Chief Scientists and Technologists Panel Presentations: *“Transforming General Purposes Forces for Warfare in the Seams”*

#### **Panel Members:**

- Mr. George W. Solhan, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations, Office of Naval Research, *“Warfare in the Seams: Defense and Industry Partnering in the Long War”*
- Mr. Jack McCready, US Coast Guard Research and Development Center, *“USCG – Deployable Operations”*

National Laboratories Panel Presentations: *“Technologies from the National Labs to Wage the Long War”*

#### **Panel Members:**

- Dr. Mark A. Buckner, Cognitive Radio Program Director RF and Microwave Systems, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, *“Technologies to Help Wage the Long War”*
  - Dr. Michael V. Fazio, Deputy Program Director for Defense and Homeland Security, Los Alamos National Laboratory, *“Los Alamos National Laboratory Overview”*
  - Dr. John Garnier, Armor Program Lead/Idaho Survivability Program, Idaho National Laboratory, *“National and Homeland Security at INL”*
  - Dr. Russell D. Skocypec, Deputy Director Human Systems and Simulation Technologies, Sandia National Laboratory, *“Technologies from the National Labs to Wage the Long War”*
  - Dr. Peter Vanier, Physicist, Detector Development Division, Nonproliferation and National Security Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory, *“Stand-Off Nuclear Radiation Detection”*

#### Tuesday, 27 February 2007

USSOCOM Service Component Panel: *“Capabilities, Challenges, and Technology Needs for Special Operations in the Long War”*

#### **Panel Member:**

- Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, USA Reserve President, Joint Special Operations University and Center Director, Special Operations Knowledge and Futures, *“Center for Knowledge and Futures (SOKF) Overview Brief”*
- Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, USA Reserve President, Joint Special Operations University and Center Director, Special Operations Knowledge and Futures, *“Joint Special Operations University”*

Reports from the Field Panel: *“Defense and Industry Vignettes in Waging Warfare in the Seams”* **Moderator and Panel Member:** Colonel Lee An Van Arsdale, USA (Ret), Chief Executive Officer, Triple Canopy, Inc. *“Warfare in the Seams Industry Vignettes”*

- Major General Benoit Puga, Commander, French Special Operations Command, *“Waging the Long War on Terrorism”*
- Major General Edward Gruszka, Commander, Polish Special Operations Command, *“Polish SOF (Report From the Field)”*
- Brigadier General Remo Butler, USA (Ret), Vice President: Operations; Operations, Maintenance, and Logistics; Kellogg Brown & Root, *“Contractors on the Battlefield”*
- Colonel Kenneth Tovo, USA, Commander, 10th Special Forces Group, *“Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP)”*
  1. Video Sadr City Operations July 2006
  2. Video Sadr City Operations August 2006
  3. Video EW Success in Sadr City
- Colonel Norman J. Brozenick, Jr., USAF, Commander, 1st Special Operations Wing, *“USAF Special Operations in the Seams”*
  1. Video Air Craft Personnel
  2. Video AC 130 H
  3. Video Battlefield Airmen
  4. Video MC 130 H

5. Video MC 130 P
6. Video Medics
7. Video MH 53
8. Video Music
9. Video 6th SOS

**Wednesday, 28 February 2007**

Keynote Address: "***Perspectives on Special Operations and Warfare in the Seams***"

Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict,

Keynote Address: "***Counter-Network Operations***"

Lieutenant General William G. "Jerry" Boykin, USA, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support "***The Global War on Terrorism or A Global Insurgency***"

**Miscellaneous:**

Major General Donald Wurster, Vice Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, "***Challenges for the Long War***"

1. Video Bad Day
2. Video CV-22
3. Video Die Tired
4. Video Gunship Fire
5. Video Predator Hellfire
6. Video Talon

Major Joe McGraw, NPS, Defense Analysis Department, "***Limitations of the National Defense Union: Why the DOD-DI relationship is best left at home***"

Captain David B. Moon, USAF, Joint Information Operations Student Department of Defense Analysis, "***Cyber-Herding: Exploiting Islamic Extremists Use of the Internet***"

Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint Staff, "***The View from the Joint Staff***"



**Theme:**  
*“Warfare in the Seams:  
Defense and Industry Partnering to Win the Long War”*

**Sunday, February 25, 2007**

12:00pm-6:00pm      **Registration Open**

**Monday, February 26, 2007**

7:00am-8:45am      **Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall**

7:00am-7:00pm      **Registration**

8:45am      **Welcome & Opening Remarks**

Lieutenant General Larry Farrell, USAF (Ret), President, NDIA

Colonel Thomas E. “Tim” Davidson, USAF (Ret), Chairman, NDIA  
SO/LIC Division and Chairman, 18th Symposium

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra, USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, 18th  
Symposium

9:00am      **Keynote Address: “Challenges to the United States and Coalition  
Forces in Waging the Long War on Terrorism”**

Brigadier General Mark T. Kimmitt, USA (Ret), Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and  
Former Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Military Spokesman for  
Coalition Forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom

9:45am      **Break**

10:00 am      **Military Services’ Chief Scientists and Technologists Panel**  
**“Transforming General Purposes Forces for Warfare in the Seams”**  
*e.g., Training and Technology required to Conduct Military Operations in  
Cities, Mountainous Regions, Desert Terrain, and to Secure Long Borders  
from Hostile Incursions*

**Moderator:** J. Frank Wattenbarger, Director Advanced Technologies,  
Concurrent Technologies Corporation

**Panel Members:**

- Mr. Richard Chandler, Director of Advanced Technology, US  
Special Operations Command
- Dr. Mark Ohair, Munitions Directorate, Air Force Research  
Laboratory

- Mr. George W. Solhan, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Operations, Office of Naval Research
- Mr. Edward J. Doucette, Director, Warfighter Protection and Aerial Delivery, Natick Soldier Research Development and Engineering Center, US Army
- Mr. Jack McCready, US Coast Guard Research and Development Center

11:50am

**Lunch (Exhibit Hall B)**

1:40 pm

**National Laboratories Panel, Regency Ball Room**

**“Technologies from the National Labs to Wage the Long War”**

**Moderators:** Major General Kenneth R. Bowra, USA (Ret), Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Liaison to USJFCOM (J-9)

**Panel Members:**

- Dr. Mark A. Buckner, Cognitive Radio Program Director RF and Microwave Systems, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
- Dr. Michael V. Fazio, Deputy Program Director for Defense and Homeland Security, Los Alamos National Laboratory
- Dr. John Garnier, Armor Program Lead / Idaho Survivability Program, Idaho National Laboratory
- Dr. Russell D. Skocypec, Deputy Director Human Systems and Simulation Technologies, Sandia National Laboratory
- Dr. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., Manager, Strategic Studies Department, Sandia National Laboratory
- Mr. John Tanke, Department of Energy Liaison to U.S. Special Operations Command
- Dr. Peter Vanier, Physicist, Detector Development Division, Nonproliferation and National Security Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory

3:30 pm

**Exhibit Hall Open (See Agenda for Industry Presentations or Demonstrations)**

5:30pm – 7:00pm

**Reception in Exhibit Hall**

**Tuesday, February 27, 2007**

7:00am-8:45am

**Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall**

7:00am-6:30pm

**Registration**

8:45am

**Administrative Remarks**

Colonel Thomas E. “Tim” Davidson, USAF (Ret), Chairman, NDIA  
SO/LIC Division and Chairman, 18th Symposium

9:00am **Keynote Address “Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Requirements to Wage the Long War,”**

General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, USA  
Commander, US Special Operations Command

9:45am **Break**

10:00am **USSOCOM Service Component Panel, Regency Ball Room  
“Capabilities, Challenges, and Technology Needs for Special Operations in the Long War”**

**Moderator:** Lieutenant General William P. Tangney, USA (Ret), Senior Vice President, Future Technologies, Inc.

**Panel Members:**

- LTG Robert W. Wagner, USA  
Commander, US Army Special Operations Command
- Lt Gen Michael W. Wooley, USAF  
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command
- Rear Admiral Joseph Maguire, USN  
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
- Major General Dennis J. Hejlik, USMC  
Commander, Marine Special Operations Command
- Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, USA Reserve  
President, Joint Special Operations University and Center Director,  
Special Operations Knowledge and Futures

12:00 pm **Lunch (Exhibit Hall B)**

1:40 pm **Reports from the Field Panel, Regency Ball Room  
“Defense and Industry Vignettes in Waging Warfare in the Seams”**

**Moderator and Panel Member:** Colonel Lee A. Van Arsdale, USA (Ret), Chief Executive Officer, Triple Canopy, Inc.

**Other Panel Members:**

- Major General Benoit Puga, Commander, French Special Operations Command
- Major General Edward Gruszka, Commander, Polish Special Operations Command
- Brigadier General Remo Butler., USA (Ret); Vice President; Operations, Maintenance, and Logistics; Kellogg Brown & Root

- Colonel Kenneth Tovo, USA. Commander, 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group
- Colonel Norman J. Brozenick, Jr., USAF, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Wing
- Captain Sean Pybus, USN, NAVSPECWARCOM Representative

4:00 pm                    **Exhibit Hall Open (See Agenda for Industry Presentations or Demonstrations)**

5:15pm – 6:30pm       **Reception in Exhibit Hall**

6:30pm – 9:30pm       **Awards Banquet and Dedication to COL Al DeProspero, USA (Ret)**

### **Wednesday, February 28, 2007**

7:00am-8:45am        **Continental Breakfast in Exhibit Hall**

7:00am-6:30pm       **Registration**

8:45am                 **Administrative Remarks**  
Colonel Thomas E. “Tim” Davidson, USAF (Ret), Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division and Chairman, 18th Symposium

9:00am                 **Keynote Address: “Perspectives on Special Operations and Warfare in the Seams”**  
Honorable Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

9:50am                 **Keynote Address: “Counter-Network Operations”**  
LTG William G. Boykin, USA  
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

10:35am                **Break in Exhibit Hall (Last opportunity to view Exhibits)**

11:40am                **Lunch and Keynote Speaker: “Transforming the Department of Defense for the Long War”**  
Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Invited)

1:30pm                 **Closing Remarks**  
Colonel Thomas E. “Tim” Davidson, USAF (Ret), Chairman, NDIA SO/LIC Division and Chairman, 18th Symposium

# ***The Global War on Terrorism Or A Global Insurgency***

*28 February 2007*

**LTG William G. Boykin, USA**  
*Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for  
Intelligence for Warfighting Support*

# *What kind of War is this?*

## ■ *Terrorism:*

- “*The calculated use of unlawful violence* or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” - JP 1-02

## ■ *Activities:*

- *Bombings*
- *Assassinations*
- *Kidnappings*
- *Robberies*
- *Intimidation through violence and threats of violence*
- *Extortion*
- *Proliferation of WMD*
- *Information (IO)*

# *Insurgency*

## ■ *Insurgency:*

- “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government [or governments] through use of subversion and armed conflict” - JP 1-02

# Comparison

## ■ *Terrorism:*

- “The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” - JP 1-02

## ■ *Insurgency:*

- “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government [or governments] through use of subversion and armed conflict” - JP 1-02

## ■ *So which is it?*



# *How do we fight?*

- *Terrorism:*

- Kill or capture terrorists

- *Insurgency:*

- Use the 7 elements of National Power

# *7 Elements of National Power*

*Diplomacy*

*Information*

*Military*

*Economic*

*Finance*

*Intelligence*

*Law Enforcement*

# *7 Elements of National Power*

*Diplomacy*

***Information***

*Military*

*Economic*

*Finance*

*Intelligence*

*Law Enforcement*

## *Bottom line*

- *Information Operations is a warfighting capability... Strategic Communication is an evolving USG-wide concept and process*
  - *Who directs the USG process day-to-day?*
- *How does the US Government (not just DoD) use Information as an element of National Power?*

# *Strategic Communication: An Evolving Concept*

- Strategic Communication (draft definition): The informational instrument of national power in an era of globalization.
- Focused US government (USG) processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national interests and policies
- Uses coordinated *information, themes, plans, programs and actions in collaboration* with other elements of national power

# *Strategic Communication*

- Policy Statements
  - US Military Exercise / Military Presence
  - News Releases, Statements
  - Leaflets, Broadcasts
  - Diplomacy, Demarches, Economic Sanctions
  - Military Diplomacy, International Military Education and Training
- 

**SC is the process of synchronizing these  
Lines of Operation**

# *Information Operations: Definition*

- “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of:

Electronic Warfare,  
Computer Network Operations,  
Psychological Operations,  
Military Deception, and  
Operations Security,


in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.”

# *Information Operations: Vision*

- Establish IO as a Core Military Competency for Combatant Commanders to:
  - Affect behavior of potential adversaries across the spectrum of conflict
  - Exploit, deny, destroy or deceive adversary information during conflict
  - Protect friendly information infrastructure and capability
- Fully integrate into crisis and deliberate planning



# The DoD IO Community



# *Information as an Element of National Power*

## • Challenges:

- Unity of effort and synchronization –no unity of command across USG
- Lack of commonly understood terms
- Consensus building, not centralized direction within USG
- How does the USG convey a consistent message via words and actions?
- “Psychological Operations”—term can be confusing or intimidating to DoS, others in USG
- Influencing audiences is not equivalent to deceiving them
- Potential friction between Public Affairs and Information Operations

# *7 Elements of National Power*

*Diplomacy*

*Information*

*Military*

*Economic*

*Finance*

*Intelligence*

*Law Enforcement*

# National v. Military Intelligence

*“Title 50 and Title 10” Euphemisms for National and Military Intelligence Respectively*

- National Intelligence and ‘intelligence related to national security’
  - (A) Pertains to more than one United States Government agency and
  - (B) Involves –threats to the United States, the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction or any other matter bearing on the United States national or homeland security.

(National Intelligence and Reform Act 2004)
- Military Intelligence
  - Intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity that is significant to military policy making or the planning and conduct of military operations and activities

(Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions, Intelligence Community Staff, June 1989)

# *HUMINT*

# DoD HUMINT

**DoD HUMINT Definition:** “A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by Human sources” (Joint Pub 1.02)

## Types of HUMINT Activities

- Military Source Operations
  - Agent Recruitment
  - Interrogation
  - Debriefing
  - Low Level Source Operations
  - Low Level Contacts
- Attaché
- Recon & Surveillance

## **Methods of conducting HUMINT Activities**

- Clandestine
- Overt (selected tasks)

# *A Condensed History of HUMINT*

- **1917-1941 Attaché critical to intelligence effort (some recruited clan sources)**
  - Perception of failure at Pearl Harbor
- **1947 National Security Act (Title 50)**
  - Established CIA (National Clandestine HUMINT)
  - Defined SECDEF authorities
- **Vietnam – robust capability**
  - Trained case officers
  - HUMINT Detachments are established worldwide
  - Conducted clandestine source operations
- **Post Vietnam/Pre-1993 (Cold War Period) No coherent Defense Program**
  - Services executed Defense HUMINT Activities
  - DIA ran attaché system
  - Over time, deferred the Secretary's Authorities
- **Post-1995 (Perry and White Era)**
  - Cold War expectations of a peace dividend led to dramatic cuts in Defense-wide HUMINT capability

## *DoD HUMINT Key Players*

- **USD(I):** provides policy direction for and oversight of Defense HUMINT activities...on behalf of SECDEF.
- **Defense HUMINT Manager (Dir, DIA):** responsible for management of the Defense HUMINT enterprise.
- **COCOMs:** responsible for meeting internal needs in respective AORs
- **Services:** collect military intelligence-
  - In support of COCOMs
  - In support of Service Title 10 related intelligence requirements
- **Directorate for HUMINT (DIA/DH):** collects
  - National Intelligence in support of National Intelligence Requirements
  - Military Intelligence in support of DoD and COCOMs



# *Military Source Operations (MSO)*

- MSO is “... the collection from, by and/or via humans, of foreign military and military-related intelligence, conducted under SECDEF authorities, to satisfy Department of Defense needs.”
  - Directly support Defense requirements (E.G., Commanders in the field, operational planners)
  - Not planned, employed, or conducted in response to or for collection of National Intelligence
- Conducted by trained personnel under direction of military commanders
- Encompass full gamut of HUMINT ops (includes LLC and LLSO)
- Require deconfliction
- Report adjunct collection of national intelligence value

# *Imperatives*

- **Coordinate, coordinate, coordinate!**
- **Leverage all HUMINT capability (ES2)**
- **Employ HUMINT capability in all environments**
- **Conduct HUMINT in consonance with other disciplines**
- **Sharing information**
- **Conduct all source intelligence analysis**

# *Questions*



# Air Force Special Operations Command

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## USAF SPECIAL OPERATIONS *IN THE SEAMS*

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**Colonel Norman J. Brozenick, Jr.,  
Commander, 1st Special Operations Wing**

# AIR COMMANDOS

# America's Specialized Airpower



# AIR COMMANDOS

# AFSOC in the Seams



- **Special Tactics in Afghanistan**
- **Foreign Internal Defense in the Trans-Sahara**
- **Surgical teams in the Philippines**
- **Global flight operations in hostile or denied airspace**

# AIR COMMANDOS



# Afghanistan




***Special Tactics Mission:* Plan, prepare, integrate, synchronize, and control air and space power to achieve assigned objectives**

# AIR COMMANDOS



# Capability



# AIR COMMANDOS



# Effect: Disrupt, Deny, Destroy



## ***Combat Controllers***

- Controlled 2,086 terminal air strikes = 2.81M lbs of bombs
- Controlled/enabled 8,982 sorties...including air ops at 15 austere airfields



## ***Combat Weathermen***

- Provided numerous high fidelity forecasts from forward locations ISO precision strike, CSAR, infil/exfil, refueling, and resupply operations



# AIR COMMANDOS

# Effect: Rescue and Recover



## ***Pararescuemen***

- Rescued/recovered teammates after MH-47 crash
- Conducted mass casualty ops after JDAM mishap Mazar-e-sharif
- Rescued MC-130P crew after crash landing at 10,500'
- Fought on Roberts Ridge... rescued and recovered ISO
- Operation Anaconda



# AIR COMMANDOS

# Trans-Sahara Region




***Foreign Internal Defense Advisor Mission:***  
**Assess, train, and advise Nigerien airmen in**  
**C-130 maintenance and flying operations**

**AIR COMMANDOS**





# Capability




# AIR COMMANDOS

**Effect: improve safety, availability, reliability and interoperability**



## ***FID Advisors***

- **Advised Nigerien maintenance refurbish efforts...returned C-130H to flight status**
- **Trained 46 operations personnel**
  - **Day tactical flying**
  - **Aerial re-supply operations**
  - **Search and Rescue**
- **Enhanced key relationship ISO EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan**



**AIR COMMANDOS**

# Republic of the Philippines




***Special Operations Surgical Team Mission:***  
provide trauma care, CASEVAC, and surgical  
operations for U.S. forces while training  
Philippine armed forces in same

# AIR COMMANDOS



# Capability



# AIR COMMANDOS



**Effect: extend partner nation medical care to forward locations beyond reach**



## ***Surgical Teams***

- **Logged 9K encounters and 3K+ procedures including**
  - **AFP Clinic: 5,144**
  - **US Forces: 338**
  - **CASEVAC: 27**
  - **Major Surgery: 6**
- **Supported 30 MEDCAPS**



# **AIR COMMANDOS**



# Global flight ops in hostile or denied territory




**Mission:** ISR, infiltration, exfiltration,  
refuel, resupply, precision fire support,  
*CSAR...Anytime, Anyplace*

# AIR COMMANDOS



# Capability



# AIR COMMANDOS

# Effect: Penetrate, Disrupt, Deny, Destroy



- Found, fixed, finished terrorists & network nodes w/ coalition teammates via
  - Robust C2 network
  - Traditional and "NT" ISR
  - Infiltration/exfiltration
  - Resupply
  - Precision fires
  - Fixed and rotary wing refueling



# AIR COMMANDOS



# AFSOC Way Ahead...in, above, & beyond the seams



- **Fighting and winning the GWOT**
- **Developing Airmen into highly capable leaders at all levels**
- **Recapitalizing and modernizing the force**

# AIR COMMANDOS



# Air Force Special Operations Command

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## USAF SPECIAL OPERATIONS *IN THE SEAMS*

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**Colonel Norman J. Brozenick, Jr.,  
Commander, 1st Special Operations Wing**

# AIR COMMANDOS

# Oak Ridge National Laboratory

*"Technologies to Help Wage the Long War"*

## Presented to the 18th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium

Mark A. Buckner, PhD  
Cognitive Radio Program Director  
RF & Microwave Systems Group  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory  
[bucknerma@ornl.gov](mailto:bucknerma@ornl.gov)  
[orbucma@doe.ic.gov](mailto:orbucma@doe.ic.gov)

26 February, 2007



**ORNL Cognitive Radio Program Mission:**  
*"to integrate software radio, sensors and computational intelligence capabilities to realize the art-of-the-possible in cognitive computing and communications to address both government and commercial problems, in a manner that enhances US National Security."*




OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY





# Oak Ridge Facilities



ORNL 2001-03779/djr

**OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY**  
**U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**

ORNL 2001-03779/djr



# ORNL is DOE's Largest Multi-Purpose Science Laboratory

- **\$1 billion budget**
- **3800 employees**
- **3000 research guests annually**
- **Nation's largest energy R&D laboratory**
- **World class computing facilities**
- **Nation's largest concentration of unclassified materials research**
- **\$1.4 billion Spallation Neutron Source under construction**
- **\$300 million modernization program in progress**






# ORNL East Campus in 2004

**DOE Upgrade of  
Main Chemistry Building**

**Battelle-Supported**

**Tennessee  
JICS/ORCAS**

**DOE Research  
Support Center**





# Multiprogram Research Facility



**Capable of handling the full range of  
national and homeland security work**




# ORNL Science and Technology Agenda Has Six Priorities




**Energy**



**Homeland/  
National Security**



**Neutron  
Science**



**Materials**




**Biology**



**Computing**





# A Center Of Excellence For Understanding Complex Biological Systems

- **Moving into a new Laboratory for Comparative and Functional Genomics**
- **Designing a state-funded facility for the Joint Institute for Biological Sciences**
- **Sequencing the hybrid poplar genome**
- **Exploring microbial genomes for bioremediation**
- **Applying life sciences capabilities to needs in homeland security**



# We are at the forefront in computing and simulation

- **Leading the partnership to develop the National Leadership Computing Facility**
  - World's best scientific computing capability
  - 100 teraflops in 2006; 250 teraflops by 2007
- **Attacking key computational challenges**
  - Climate change
  - Fusion
  - Nuclear astrophysics
  - Materials sciences
  - Biology
- **Providing access to our computational resources through high-speed networking**



# We are developing and deploying world-class tools for nanoscale R&D


## Spallation Neutron Source

- High-intensity neutrons for materials research at the nanoscale
- 1.4 MW of beam power on target
- 16 instruments




## High Flux Isotope Reactor

- The nation's leading research reactor
- World-class for neutron scattering




## Center for Nanophase Materials Sciences

- \$65M facility now in operation
- 75 user projects already under way
- DOE's first nanoscience research center



## Ultrahigh-resolution microscopy

- Advanced Microscopy Laboratory
- Aberration-corrected electron microscope
- World-record resolution: 0.6 Å





# The Spallation Neutron Source

Total cost: \$1.4 billion

- **Operational in 2006**
- **World's most powerful pulsed neutron source**
- **With complementary resources at the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Oak Ridge will lead the world in neutron scattering**



# We have significant strengths in key areas

Radiological and nuclear weapons countermeasures

- **RDD attribution studies, forensics program development, and decontamination of the aftermath**
- **Active interrogation technologies**
- **Radiation detection technologies and new materials**


Chemical and biological

- **Mass spectrometry**
- **Bioinformatics**
- **Host-pathogen interactions**



Threat vulnerability testing and assessment

- **Geospatial science**
- **Plume/effect modeling**
- **Cybersecurity technology**



Infrastructure protection

- **Vulnerability assessment and mitigation**

Crosscutting

- **Sensor technologies**
- **Knowledge discovery**





# Program areas

- **Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation**
- **Homeland Security**
- **Department of Defense**
- **Other Government Agencies**






# Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs

- **Material Protection Control and Accounting**
- **Fissile Materials Disposition**
- **International Safeguards**
- **HEU Transparency**
- **Export Controls**
- **Radiological Dispersal Devices**
- **Nuclear Material Detection & Identification**



# Homeland Security Programs

- Radiological/nuclear countermeasures
- Threat and vulnerability testing and assessment
- Biological and chemical countermeasures
- Standards development
- Countermeasures Testbed
- Regional Technology Integration
- Protective Security Analysis Center
- Transportation analysis
- Highway weigh station radiation portal monitors
- FEMA support activities





# Department of Defense


- **Military transformation**
- **Chem/Bio defense and early warning**
- **Logistics and transportation management**
- **Defense materials**
- **Sensor miniaturization and communication**
- **Information management, synthesis and analysis**




SensorNet



Marine Asset Security & Tracking System (MAST)





MICLOG



Small Contingency Theater Positioning System (SCTPS)



IC



ORNL Tracking System






# Cognitive Radio: What is it?

"a disruptive, but unobtrusive technology" [Haykin05]

## Cognition/Intelligence?


- **"knowing, perceiving, or conceiving** as an act..." [Oxford English Dictionary]
- **"interdisciplinary study** ... concerned with exploring general principles of intelligence through a synthetic methodology termed learning by understanding." [Pfeifer & Scheier99]
- **Intelligence:** "The capacity to **acquire** and **apply** knowledge, especially toward a purposeful **goal**." [American Heritage\_00]



**Future Cognitive Systems:**  
*"will converse with the user,  
 anticipate their needs and adapt  
 to meet them ..."*

## Cognitive Radio is an intelligent wireless communication systems that:

- **Senses (Awareness):** acquires and maintains knowledge of its environment, internal capabilities/ states and user needs
- **Reasons:** uses goal-oriented rules/reasoning (model-based) to adjust adaptation goals
- **Adapts (Reconfigurable):** adjusts Rx/Tx parameters (frequency, modulation, power) and internal states in real-time to meet user requirements
- **Learns:** uses statistical and machine learning to reflect on past performance and create new statistical models, etc. to achieve better performance over time
- **Plans/Acts:** anticipates and schedules required future actions based on current and past conditions
- **Collaborates:** leverage experience/capabilities of other CRs to attain goals
- **For the primary purpose of providing:**
  - Highly reliable communications w/ assured QoS
  - Robust performance
  - Efficient spectrum utilization



# Overview of SD/CR-related Capabilities

- **Multi-Waveform Prototypes**

- One effort combined wideband RFID waveform (30 Mcps DSSS) with narrow band RFID and Satcom.
- Another effort combined Satcom waveform with sensor signal processing.
- Started an effort to combine Satcom, specialized comms, conventional terrestrial communications, sensor signal processing and cognitive control engine into a single prototype by end of FY08.


- **Rapid Prototyping**

- Use of MATLAB/Simulink/Sys Gen Model-Based Design Approach.
- Prototype SDR system was tested OCONUS within 60 days of receipt of funds.

- **Reduced SWAP**

- Working on rapid method to port SDR designs to ASIC
- Working with DOD to develop improved power source

# Geolocation Gap-Fillers





# Waveform Development Progress

- **Zigbee**
- **IEEE 802.11b**
- **Bluetooth**
- **Wi-Max**
- **UWB**
- **SATCOM**
- **FastHSS**
- **LPI/LPD Waveforms**
- **LF Navigation (TPS)**
- **Legacy Sensor**


# RFID/Tagging Waveforms

- WhereNet
- SAVI

- **Channel Sounder Waveforms**



# Internal R&D TTL Project FY07-08





# Contractors on the Battlefield

27 February 2007




**KBR**

Government  
and Infrastructure




# LOGCAP III in OEF and OIF



- 19,300 Direct Hire U.S. & International Employees
- 29,000 Subcontractor personnel
- \$3B worth of equipment and supplies

# Iraq – Constant Change . . . . As Expected

## Pace and Scope . . . . Unexpected





# Contractor Mobilization

- Recruiting Qualified Personnel
  - Pool of Experienced Personnel
  - Recruiting Efforts
  - Third Country Nationals (Including Former Balkan HCNs)
  - Host Country National Hires
- Processing & Deploying Personnel
  - Medical screening
  - Background check
  - Job-specific training (defensive/evasive driving course, NBC training, etc.)
- Retaining Qualified Personnel
  - Pay
  - R&R
  - Prospect of Continued Work



# LOGCAP III Program Overview – *We Deliver*

DESIGN • CONSTRUCT • OPERATE • MAINTAIN

## BASE CAMP SUPPORT

Ice  
Fuel  
O&M  
MWR  
DFAC  
HVAC  
Water  
Billeting  
Laundry  
Latrines  
Showers  
Fire Fighting  
Vector Control  
Waste Removal  
Power Generation



## LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Class I – Rations & Water  
Class II - Indiv Equip/Tools/Supplies  
Class III – Fuel (Packaged & Bulk)  
Class IV - Construction Material  
Class V - Ammo  
Class IX - Repair Parts  
Joint Distribution Center  
Forward Re-Distribution Point  
Maintenance Organizational/Direct  
Ice Distribution  
Mail Distribution  
Movement Control  
Maintenance/Recovery  
Material Handling Equipment  
Line Haul (Bulk Fuel/HET/Flatbeds)

CLSS



TTM

We Deliver DAILY	Water (Gal)	10 MM	Fuel (Gal)	839,000	Ice (Tons)	429
	Meals	432,000	MWR Patrons	77,000	Laundry (Bags)	33,000
SCOPE	Number of Countries	8	Total KBR Employees	18,000	Boots on Ground	225,000

as of 21 Sep 06

# Life Support – Village Concept

## Sample Site Plan



## Available Accommodations



# Operating Environment

## KBR: A Civilian Company in War!

From the beginning of the shooting war on 20 Mar. 2003, Task Order 43 grew from a base of zero through a period of extremely rapid growth to meet the mission




**Continually Escalating Environment -- Small Arms Fire, Rocket Attacks, Mortars and Improvised Explosive Devices and Extremes of Climate, Brutal Road Conditions & Rock Throwing**



# Force Protection...Hostile Environment

- The enemy has options to impact our mission
- Since beginning of project
  - **68 Killed in Action**
  - **524 Wounded in action**
- Period from 01 Jan – 30 Sep 06
  - **400+ Improvised Explosive Devices**
  - **800+ Indirect Fire**
  - **200+ Small Arms Fire**

**Contractors on the battlefield is not just a phrase ... it is a reality!**



**KBR**

Government  
and Infrastructure



# Force Protection – Camp D4 Falcon

## Enemy Mortar Rounds Ignite Ammo Storage Dump



- 10 Oct 2006 - 120 KBR Personnel
- Located 10 miles south of Green Zone
- 3 Mortar attacks on camp

**No KBR or Military casualties**

# Multi-national Force – Iraq (Baghdad Sites)

## KBR Continues Operations In A Combat Environment Without A Single Mission Failure



Rocket Attack BIAP Laundry



Hard Car  
after IED



War Eagle Mortar Attack

### How difficult is it to maintain a schedule in Baghdad?

- D1A Hope/War Eagle received 314 mortar and 7 rockets in one month with 103 in one day
- One Expat Subcontractor was kidnapped and 12 HCN subs were killed during the construction of the War Eagle DFAC
- **Every day during the POP an indirect fire attack was directed at one or more of the sites on this project**



# Local Nationals and the Iraq Mission – Economic Zones



- Create a 'safe' area where the HN labor force is more efficiently utilized
- Build an area which houses an industrial type zone which utilizes local labor in manufacturing, servicing and/or training
- Create a work force that may be later screened for work 'inside' the wire
- Keep construction costs low by
  - Allowing the HCNs to build infrastructure
  - Use hasty type structures which use salvage and harvested raw materials as much as possible



# Contractors on the Battlefield

## Congressional Budget Office Study (October 2005)

Billions of 2005 Dollars

20 Year Total

**LOGCAP Contractor Support**

**\$41.4**

**Total Army Costs**

**\$93.0**

**Difference in Total Cost**

**\$51.6**

# The Future -- Integrated Team



**Back up**

**KBR**

Government  
and Infrastructure

# Theater Transportation Mission

## Convoy Commander Position – The Backbone of TTM

KBR initiative to improve command and control over each convoy

### Convoy Commanders:

- Capitalize on ‘ATTITUDE’
- Increase responsibility
- Enhance communications
- Provide ‘field’ leadership
- Facilitate ‘TEAM’ building
- Key element of stability
- Many with previous military experience
- Trusted by soldiers
- After action agents

Many now serve within other KBR functions



**“An Essential Element of Success”!!!**



# Defense of Freedom Medal

- Support ASC in presentation of Defense of Freedom Medals to wounded KBR employees and families of deceased KBR employees
- Provide KBR senior leadership opportunity to thank employees and their families for their service
- 47 awards presented on 09 February 2007 – Houston
- 31 awards presented on 17 March 2006 – Houston
- 8 awards presented in January 2006 – Iraq
- 1 award presented in May 2006 – Iraq
- 8 awards presented in July 2006 – Iraq
- *38 nominations submitted pending approval*





# Los Alamos National Laboratory Overview

*18th Annual SO/LIC Symposium*

*Michael V. Fazio*

**Deputy Program Director for  
Dept. of Defense Programs**



**Our Mission - 1943:** in the span of two years.....  
***“the physical sciences were turned up-side down.”***


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**PAJARITO PLATEAU**



**THE GADGET**




**TRINITY SHOT**

## **2007 Mission: Enhance Global Security by**

- Ensuring the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent
- Reducing global threats
- Solving national problems in defense, energy, environment, infrastructure, and health security

# Los Alamos National Laboratory executes a large and complex set of programs

## Weapons Research



Large-Scale Simulation  
Stockpile Stewardship



B61-11



W80 for Advanced  
Cruise Missile




Pit Manufacturing




W76, W78, W88  
for Trident &  
Minuteman III


## Basic Research



Fuel Cell



Neutron Spectrometer  
Map of Mars



Atom Trapping  
and Cooling

## Threat Reduction



Nuclear Response



Advanced  
Characterization  
of Biological Agents




Image Analysis




# Los Alamos encompasses a large and complex site

- **Core Employees**      9000
- **Technical Staff**    4000
- **PhD**                    2000
- **Post-docs**            400
- **Students**            1500
- **Operating budget** ~\$2.2 B
- **Land area** ~40 square miles

**Very broad and deep science and engineering capabilities, driven by critical National needs**



LANL (green) compared with Washington, D.C.



LANSCE-  
Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

# Strategic Thrust Areas for Threat Reduction

*Locate, Track, Detect  
nuclear materials worldwide*



**Nuclear  
Nonproliferation**

**Threat  
Reduction**

**International  
Technology**

**Defense**

**Homeland  
Security**




**Tunable Metastable Interstitial  
Composite (MIC) Explosives  
Nanoscale High Energy Density  
Materials**

**Distributed Satellite  
Sensor Systems**




***“Global Situational  
Awareness  
Coupled with  
Response”***



**UNCLASSIFIED**




# Homeland Security - Reducing Threats of WMD and Terrorism




**Airborne toxin  
transport modeling**

**Bioforensics**




**Nuclear emergency aid**

**Noninvasive acoustic  
chemical ID**



**Infrastructure simulation  
& analysis**






**Nuclear detection -  
passive muon radiography**



UNCLASSIFIED

# Defense - *Deter, Detect, Deny, Respond*

Moonless geo-registered image from single-photon imager on UAV surrogate



RULLI- Remote Ultra-low light 3D imaging with time tagged single photons

## GENIE: GENetic Imagery Exploitation

Automated Scene Classification - translation of expert knowledge into **automated** knowledge extraction to handle

huge data flows



Training



Exploitation



Input Image

Training Image

Test Image

Output of GENIE





# Mission Driven Science is a Los Alamos Hallmark - Satellite-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring


*New solutions from science resulting from national needs*

## New Science Contributions

Gamma-ray bursts, water on moon/mars, magnetospheres of earth and planets.

## National Need

*Detect nuclear explosions in atmosphere and space - everywhere, all the time.*



## Solutions


Triggering codes, imaging for homeland security, new detectors.



## Existing and Emerging S&T

Satellite Instrumentation, x-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, EMP sensors


21 Sep 05 16:00-17:00 UTC



Rita category 5: intense lightning marks boundary of eyewall - EdotX sensors

## New Capabilities

Coded aperture x-ray imaging, Doppler neutron spectroscopy, neutral-particle imaging.







Map of Hydrogen (Water) on Mars




Cassini exploring Saturn's moons and rings 2005

# 40 Years of Space Experience - A Headstart on Persistent Surveillance - 1400 sensors, 120 instruments, 60 satellites



**Multi-Spectral  
Thermal  
Imager**






# Thinking Telescopes - Find and conduct detailed follow-up observations of transient source anomalies in real time

## - against a huge background

*Nightly variation of the optical sky, even for bright objects, is largely unexplored*



### Networked Robotic Hardware

- Wide FOV
- Rapid response
- Real time analysis pipeline

### Machine Learning

- Automated feature extraction
- Anomaly detection
- Object classifiers


### Thinking Telescope

### Adv. Database Technology

- Virtual observatories
- Distributed disk arrays
- Intelligent clients

*Change detection tools can be applied to terrestrial applications*

# The Problem: 2 Minute Look at 1/50,000 of the Haystack









# Directed Energy - Response at the Speed of Light


*40 Years of High Average Power Accelerator Experience Supporting Navy Free Electron Laser Development*



*Ultra-Compact High Power (0.5 MW/10kW)  
100-300 GHz MM-Wave/THz Sources*

## Enabling Technology:


- Sheet beam formation and transport
- Planar RF structures



## Enabling technology for:

- Radar
- Hi-Res Imaging
- Covert Comms
- Remote Sensing
- Active denial

## Planar RF structure



**Contact: Bruce Carlsten, [bcarlsten@lanl.gov](mailto:bcarlsten@lanl.gov)**

**Ultimate TWT Configuration**

# Los Alamos Multi-Disciplinary Capabilities Are Tapped to Look for End to End Solutions

## IED - Defeat Chain

INTELLIGENCE      SURVEILLANCE      DETECTION      DEFEAT

Multiple Pathways For Technology Insertion & Deployment

### Intel & Analysis

- Intelligence on terrorist threats and emerging capabilities
- Understanding terrorist capabilities in WMD and advanced explosives

### Modeling Societies & Intents

- Threat Anticipation Project: simulations of insurgency societies

### Sensors & Information Science

- Surveillance and detection of electronics
- Wide area persistent surveillance & real-time data distribution
- Remote Raman-LIBS detection
- Stealthy Insect Sensors of H-E vapor
- High power mm wave deployable sources to detect at-range and/or pre-detonate
- Knowledge engines, decision-making algorithms, data-fusion
- Anomaly, change recognition, identification and tracking algorithms


### High Explosive Chemistry & Facilities

- Single H-E crystal characterization for detection sensors
- HE signatures

### Disable & Defeat Capabilities

- High power microwave defeat of electronics
- Thermite Blanket for IED defeat
- Render Safe Technologies

# The Challenge: Event to Knowledge to Action *in Real Time*



# Los Alamos Continues a 63 Year History of Paradigm Changing R&D

---

- Mission-driven science in the National interest
- Underpinned with broad and deep multidisciplinary science and engineering capabilities - *much more than a nuclear weapons laboratory*
- Long history of successfully fielding complex hardware on time scales of days, weeks, & years in harsh environments with autonomous operation
- Portfolio extends across many programs with many sponsors
- Routinely partner and collaborate with other government agencies, industry, and academia

Contact: Michael Fazio, 505-667-3281, [mfazio@lanl.gov](mailto:mfazio@lanl.gov)



# ***National and Homeland Security at INL***

---

- ***The United States of America is faced with unprecedented challenges in National and Homeland Security***
- ***The Idaho National Laboratories is well positioned to meet many of these challenges and enable sustainability for the long war***

- **Multi-Directorate Federal R&D Laboratory**
- **Leverage science and engineering technologies to form international partnerships that address both DOE R&D and National and Homeland needs**
- **Annual budget of ca. \$600M**
- **3,400 scientists, engineers, technicians, and other staff**
- **Three S&T Campuses on 890 square mile site**



# The INL R&D


Mission execution is guided by five laboratory divisions



*Nuclear Energy*



***National Security***



*Energy and  
Environmental  
Sciences*



*Advanced Test  
Reactor*



*Specific  
Manufacturing  
Capability*

# Our Focus Areas Support *Multiple Missions and Enable Sustainability*

**Global  
Security**

**National  
Defense**

**Homeland  
Security**

**Special  
Programs**

**Energy  
Security**

## Focus Areas



**SCADA /  
Cyber/ Power  
Grid**



**Wireless  
Technology**



**Unmanned  
Vehicle  
Systems**



**Explosives  
Detection &  
Testing**



**Chemical / Nuclear  
Detection, and  
Nonproliferation /  
Safeguards &  
Security**



**Special Mfg Center  
Emerging Armor--  
Vehicle / Barrier/  
Structural/ Personnel**


## Technology Platforms



**Process Controls**



**Materials**



**Physics, Molecular Science, Modeling**





# National & Homeland Security


## *Objectives & Key Customers We Serve*

Mission Area	Customer	Strategic Objective
Global Security	NNSA	Reduce global nuclear threats through innovative nonproliferation and counterproliferation technologies
National Defense	DoD	Provide solutions to asymmetric threats and combat WMD
Homeland Security	DHS	Develop science and technology to protect critical infrastructure systems and improve resilience
Special Programs	Various Clients	Provider of choice, in selected areas, for technology based solutions to the U.S. Intelligence Community
Energy Security	DOE-OE	Enhance security and reliability of the nation's energy systems


# National and Homeland Security *INL Survivability Program (ISP)*

The ISP is an Agile Collaboration of Capabilities at *One Location*

1. Armor and Barrier Development
2. Ballistic and Blast Modeling Simulation
3. Ballistic and Blast Test & Evaluation
4. Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments
5. Specific Manufacturing Capability
6. Explosives Detection and Advanced Technology Development
7. Ballistics and Explosives Attack Avoidance & Hardware Development
8. Technology Transfer for Scale Up  
*Hardware to the End User*



# Example of INL Commercial Partnership in Survivability Systems Development



# *National and Homeland Security*

## **INL Survivability Program (ISP) - Leadership**

### **Armor Development**

- Leadership in design, development, and testing of high-density, lightweight armor against multiple threats.
- Test range with extensive capability for confidential testing.
- INL armor proven against ballistic, kinetic, blast & frag threats.



### **Explosives Testing**

- Leadership in trace and bulk explosives detection, blast effects, shock and vibration analysis.
- Class Facilities: 20,000 Lb TNT equivalent test range and Class II, Div. I Operations Room for explosives assembly.
- Performance/ Resiliency Testing: Ballistic Penetration, Structural Analysis, Computer Modeling/Simulation,
- Development of Protective Countermeasures.



### **Technology Development**


- Leadership through over 3,500 world-class scientists and engineers in technology development and national security solutions.
- Award-winning technologies in Global use: Idaho Explosives Detection System, Breaching Shotgun, Tactical Timed Firing Device, Change Detection System, PINS for Munitions Assessment



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
- **Advanced Materials**
  - Ballistic Steels
  - Alloyed Metals
  - Ceramics
  - Transparent Ceramics
  - Polymers
  - Composites
  - Joining
- **Design & Simulation**
  - Ballistic
  - Blast
  - Fragmentation
- **Prototyping & Evaluation**
- **Special Manufacturing Center**
  - Over 9000 Abrams Premier battle tanks in use worldwide

# Optical Armor and Ballistic Results






- Aluminum Oxy-Nitride is a “premier” transparent armor material. Today, AION is not available to in commercial quantities. Presence of residual porosities will prevent full optical transparency
- INL is developing novel approaches to pressure-less sintering of ALON.

- Successful Target LOS AD = 10.5 lb/sq ft
- Design: ALON + polyurethane + polycarbonate
- Defeat: 30-cal APM2 @ 2810-2828 ft/sec @ 20.5' standoff




# Lightweight, High-performance Gunner Ballistic Cupola

## *INL CRADA Demonstration Project*





***Improved Ballistic / Blast Resistant Conformal Armor Cupola***

# Joining and Welding of Metal Alloys Using Advanced Solid-State Friction Stir Welding



**INL's  
Advanced  
Tooling  
Materials**






# ISP's Full Scope Multi-Services Supports

## *Up-Armoring Special Operation Combatant Crafts*

- **Armor expertise and T&E support to USSOCOM on retrofit armor solutions for the Coastal Assault Craft (CAC) and new Special Operation Craft – Riverine (SOCR)**
- **Consultation and design supports provided to SOCR builder**
- **Development of close-quarter ricochet and shrapnel suppression system**
- **Riverine fleet expanded from initial “x” to “y” units, based in Stannis, MS**
- **Currently deployed at Tigris River, Iraq**



# INL Live-fire Range Complex & Capabilities



- 10 ranges
- Live fire training
- Various weapons

- Surface Danger Zones = 4.7 miles. At the 20,000 lb range = 8 miles
- Live Fire Ballistic Test Range
  - 30 cal, 50 cal APM2
  - 14.5 mm BS32, BS41
  - 20 mm FSP and AP
  - LAW and RPG
  - 30 mm FSP and AP
  - Other: hypersonic
- Explosive R&D range
  - 500 lbs.
  - 20,000 lbs.
- Fabrication shop support

# Design and Simulation

---

- **Vehicle Armor**
- **Personnel Protection**
- **Barrier Armor**
- **Ballistic Effects**
- **Blast Effects**
- **Combined Ballistic and Blast**
- **Molecular modeling (explosives)**
- **Molecular Engineering (novel organics)**
- **Processing of Ceramics and Polymers**

# INL Applied Mechanics

*INL Center For Advanced Modeling and Simulation (CAMS)*

- **Analytical**

- Nuclear Reactor safety analyses
- Pressure vessels and piping
- Flight safety
- Shock and vibration
- High-velocity and hyper-velocity impact
- Blast

- **Experimental**


- Impact
- High strain-rate materials
- High temperature materials
- Shock and vibration

- **Design**

- Prototype and One-of-a-kind

## Analytical Tools:

- ✓ ABAQUS/ Explicit
- ✓ LS-DYNA
- ✓ CTH
- ✓ ALEGRA
- ✓ ALE3D





# Explosives Detection & Defeat

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**Bulk Explosives Detection Programs**

**Trace Explosives Detection Programs**


**Tactical Timed Firing Devices/Disruptors**

# Bulk Explosives Detection Programs

## Neutron Interrogation Systems - X-Ray and CT Technologies

### 1. Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS)

--- Identifies chemicals/explosives in munitions



Single Munitions Scanner (SMS) (component of Mobile Munitions Assessment System (MMAS))

### 2. Remote/Standoff Explosives Detection System (R/SEDS)



--- Detects explosives in medium-sized trucks and vans



# Trace Explosives Detection Programs


## I. Trace Detection Systems Testing – FAA and TSL

- Perform Independent Validation and Verification testing for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- Test trace detection systems against actual explosive threats
  - IEDs in Electronic Devices
  - IED Manufacturers
  - IED Couriers
  - IED in Suitcases
- Ion Mobility (+-) Spectrometer research in trace explosives




## II. Trace Detection Systems Development

- Develop and test advanced Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS) concepts and prototypes
- TeraHertz Sensors R&D
- Advanced IMS modeling capability




# Tactical Timed Firing Devices/Disruptors

## Remote Firing Devices



**Multi – IED Disruptor uses “operator selected” kinetic energy penetrators**





# Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex



# Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex

- National, comprehensive program where technologies, systems and policies that protect the nation's critical infrastructure are developed, tested and validated under real-world conditions
- INL is the DOE National SCADA Test Bed
- INL separate site power grid. \$100M's of isolated infrastructure investments over past 50 yrs.
- Research Test Beds include:
  - Explosives Detection (Bulk and Trace)
  - Explosives/Weapons Effects Testing
  - Unique Communications/Wireless Test bed
  - UAV Research
  - SCADA Vulnerabilities
  - Cyber Security and Physical Security
  - Contraband & Weapons Detection



# INL's Unique Communications Range Capabilities

## 1) “Clean” Frequency Spectrum

- Low RF noise: No urban areas or military bases
- NTIA Experimental Radio Station, Local Spectrum Manager
- Can use Next Generation / International frequencies given:  
a) no harmful interference, b) test / experimental use only



## 2) Full-Scale, Isolated Communications Networks

- Cell grid is isolated from PSTN, Fiber net isolated via DWDM
- Ability to link with other INL assets or external labs
- Future: Full Telco/ISP test range combined with Cyber R&D



## 3) “Open” Range that Cooperates with Commercial Vendors

- Commercial infrastructures are complex
- Mix of worldwide (foreign) vendors
- Leverage testing experience with cutting-edge commercial technologies



## 4) Flexible, Multi-program Lab

- Confluence of a variety of infrastructures (Cyber, SCADA, Comms, Physical)
- Variety of capabilities (R&D, Integration, IV&V Test, QRC, Train, Analysis ...)
- Range assets, simulation resources, engineering, and operations staff

# Robotics

---

- **DOD Unmanned Systems Program Area**
- **Robotic Autonomous Countermine Development**
- **Robotic Intelligent NDe (RINO)**
- **Next-Generation User Interface Development**
- **UAV Autonomous Flight Operations**
- **Geospatial Data Collection/Exploitation**
- **Unmanned Air/Ground Vehicle Collaboration**



# DOD Unmanned Systems Program Area


**Application & Mission Development**



**Unmanned Systems R&D**



**INL Facilities Infrastructure**





**Video Mosaic, Stabilization, Geo-referencing**

**Robot Intelligence Kernel**



# Robotic Autonomous Countermine Development



- 4 times faster than trained human
- 100% (134 / 134) Detected SLM
- Low Cost



# Robotics: Robotic Intelligent NOde (RINO)

- Capability for 5 mission variants with and *without* human



Mode of Autonomy	Defines Task Goals	Supervises Vehicle Direction	Motivates Motion	Prevents Collisions
Teleop	<i>Human</i>	<i>Human</i>	<i>Human</i>	<i>Human</i>
Safe	<i>Human</i>	<i>Human</i>	<i>Human</i>	<i>Robot</i>
Shared	<i>Human</i>	<i>Human</i>	<i>Robot</i>	<i>Robot</i>
HLTasking	<i>Human</i>	<i>Robot</i>	<i>Robot</i>	<i>Robot</i>
Autonomous	<i>Robot</i>	<i>Robot</i>	<i>Robot</i>	<i>Robot</i>

- Development of an autonomous unmanned system for COTS 4-Wheel ATV for test and demonstration of sensors, behaviors, and payloads for ground based Unmanned Vehicles System Development.





- **Affordability:** commercial ATV Ground Vehicles

# Next-Generation User Interface Development




- Detection and Recognition → Decision and Action






# UAV Autonomous Flight Operations Geospatial Data Collection/Exploitation



# Unmanned Air/Ground Vehicle Collaboration





## National and Homeland Security at INL

- The United States of America is faced with unprecedented challenges in National and Homeland Security
- The Idaho National Laboratories is well positioned to meet many of these challenges and enable sustainability for the long war



**John Garnier**  
**Armor Program Lead**  
[john.garnier@inl.gov](mailto:john.garnier@inl.gov)





## POLISH SOF (REPORT FROM THE FIELD)



27 FEB 2007

MG Edward GRUSZKA





**SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



# **AGENDA**

**CURRENT POLISH SOF STRUCTURE**

**SOC MISSION STATEMENT**

**SOF MAIN TASKS**

**OPERATIONS & COOPERATION**


**WAY AHEAD**





## THREATS

**GLOBALIZATION**



**ASYMMETRIC ACTIVITIES**



**COLLAPSING REGIMES**



**DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES**



**NATURAL RESOURCES VIOLENCE**




**UNSTABLE MIDDLE EAST**





# CURRENT SOF STRUCTURE





## (PL) SOC MISSION

**Enable and support Special Operations across the Poland and Alliance and provide the focal point for Special Operations expertise to MOD by:**

- C<sup>2</sup> Polish SOF;
- Providing direct link between SOF and MOD;
- Providing MOD with timely, effective, Special Operations Forces advice in support of the planning and execution of operations;
- Coordinating, synchronizing and supporting of the SOF force generation process;
- Translating SOF strategic estimates into SOF operational tasks;
- Developing and publishing SOF Policies, Doctrine, SOP and SOI;
- Coordinating, synchronizing, and supporting SOF education, training and exercises;
- Coordinating training and development capability of the Polish SOF through a Federation of NATO SOF Training Centers.





**SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



# **SOF MAIN TASKS**



**SPECIAL  
RECONNAISSANCE**

**DIRECT  
ACTIONS**

**COUNTER TERRORISM  
OPERATIONS**

**MILITARY  
ASSISTANCE**

**MISCELLANEOUS**






**SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



# **MAIN OPERATIONS**





# SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



## IRAQ







SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



# AFGHANISTAN








SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



# MULTIRATERAL COOPERATION

## GROM



3,5,10 SFG  
Navy Seals



22 SAS Reg  
SBS



BBE



Marine Jagerkommando  
Haeren Jagerkommando



URNA




YPT



Israel SF

## 1st SOF Regiment



10 SFG  
75 Ranger Reg



21 SAS Reg



200th Deep Recce Coy

## FORMOZA



Navy Seals



BBE



# SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



## TRAINING





## THEY SAID ...

**„ Unit GROM is absolutely parallel with DELTA unit.  
It is a very big achievement giving Poland an important  
international asset”**

Zbigniew Brzeziński – Former Security Adviser of US President

**„ Polish SOF unit GROM is the first class, outstanding  
people with outstanding morale ...  
I would be very happy if I could work with this unit  
during the emergency situation”**

Generall Wayne A. Downing



# **WAY AHEAD**

**D  
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
**REORGANIZATION OF  
C2 STRUCTURE**



**UNITS TTPs AND EQUIPEMENT  
UNIFICATION**



**REORGANIZATION CS, CSS**




**EQUIPPED WITH HIGH  
TECHNOLOGY**





## FUTURE SOF STRUCTURE





**SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



# **HIGH TECHNOLOGY**

**NETWORK-CENTRIC CAPABILITIES**

**CYBER SPACE**



**UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES**



**OPTOELECTRONICS, GPS**



**HIGH TARGETING ASSETS**



# **INTEROPERABILITY**

- **Interoperability needs to be a community effort.**
- **We have concentrated on CIS to date, we are moving into Intel Recce Surveillance and Target Acquisition (IRSTA)...what next?**
- **Joint Special Operations Capabilities Task Force is therefore the primary point of entry.**
- **Impact to date:**
  - **CIS experimentation campaign;**
  - **Precision Airdrop systems in service;**
  - **Warfare Ops Center connectivity.**



QUESTIONS ?



# ***US Special Operations Command***

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## **Center for Knowledge and Futures (SOKF)**

### **Overview Brief**



**Briefer: BG Hashem**

**Director - SOKF**

**Date: 27 FEB 07**

The overall classification of this briefing is:

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Derived From: N/A  
Declassify On: N/A





# Mission

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**The Center for Knowledge and Futures  
develops and integrates warfighting  
capabilities for the present and future in order  
to train, organize and equip special  
operations forces to synchronize and execute  
global operations against terrorist networks  
and deploy combat ready forces to combatant  
commands.**




# SOKF Title 10 Functions

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- **Develop Strategy, Doctrine, and Tactics**
- **Educate and Train SOF**
- **Conduct Specialized Courses**
- **Prioritize and Validate Training Requirements**
- **Ensure Interoperability of Equipment and Forces**
- **Conduct Joint SOF Concept Development, Wargaming, Experimentation, and Integration**
- **Ensure Combat Readiness of SOF**
- **Prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions**




# USSOCOM Organization







# SOKF Organization





# Joint SOF Body of Knowledge (J7)

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- **Develop Joint special operations doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures**
  - Facilitate integration of SOF doctrine into joint and service institutions
- **Develop a comprehensive education strategy that complements component, Service, and PME programs**
  - Provide support to JSOU
  - Expand educational opportunities for SOF
- **Execute USSOCOM's Lessons Learned Program**
  - Provide recommended solutions to observations
  - Integrate Lessons Learned into joint doctrine and education



# Joint SOF Training (J7)

---

- **Execute the SOF Language Program**
  - Strategy, prioritization and program management
- **Provide training oversight**
  - Develop training policy, identify and validate training requirements
- **Manage CJCS Joint Training System for USSOCOM**
  - Develop and maintain JMETL
  - Develop joint training plans, policies and publications
- **Develop and conduct specialized courses**
  - Military Liaison Element Seminar
- **Oversee Mission Training & Preparation Systems (MTPS)**
  - Training simulations, planning, preview & mission rehearsal



# Warrior Preparation (J7)

---

- **Ensure USSOCOM's readiness to perform its warfighter tasks**
  - **Plan, coordinate, and execute a comprehensive internal exercise program designed to enhance the effectiveness of the deployable battlestaff (ABLE WARRIOR and ABLE FOCUS)**
- **Assess command support to GCCs and training events**
  - **Coordinate support to the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) exercise program**
  - **MRX participation, JSOTF training**
  - **SOF participation, scenario development, exercise management and assessment**





# Strategic Visioning & Joint Concept Development (J9)

---

- **Lead creation of a compelling SOF Vision of the future**
  - **Develop joint SOF-specific and Joint Operating Concepts IAW the “USSOCOM Future Concept Development Campaign Plan” to mature the Vision**
  - **Synchronize concept development with Joint community, DOD, and interagency**
  - **Sponsors concepts and associated capabilities within SOF for Joint experimentation**
  - **Develop future SOF capabilities supporting the War on Terror**
- **Develop USSOCOM Transformation Roadmap**
  - **Design long-range strategy and vision implementation plan**



# Wargaming and Experimentation (J9)

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- **Lead USSOCOM's Wargame and Experimentation activities IAW approved Wargame and Experimentation Campaign Plan**
  - **Design, develop, and publish detailed external wargame plans to guide, measure, and validate objectives based on SOF concepts**
  - **Ensure data collection/analysis plans are developed for analytically sound wargame results**
  - **Identify SOF capability gaps as candidates for experimentation**
  - **Provide DOTMLPF change recommendations from experiment results**
  - **Manage and prioritize activities of the SORSE**



# Capabilities Based Assessment (J9)

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- **Develop, Coordinate, and Maintains USSOCOM Long Range Planning Process**
  - **Integrate futures requirements into command resourcing and planning processes**
  - **Manage USSOCOM and Component Joint SOF Future Concept related Joint Capabilities Integration Development System Analysis**
- **Manage USSOCOM Capability Evaluation Process**
  - **Develop and maintain USSOCOM Prioritized Capability List**
  - **Coordinate solutions to capability gaps**
  - **Coordinate S&T and Acquisition proposals**



# Summary

- SOKF integrates the *J7* and *J9* to *conduct SOF Combat Development*
- Responsible for *SOF training standards, doctrine, lessons learned, SOF language programs, education programs, exercises, interoperability, future concepts, experimentation, wargames, and integration of future requirements* into command resourcing and planning processes

**SOKF supports the education and training of the SOF warfighter of today, while shaping and preparing USSOCOM for the warfight of tomorrow**



# *Joint Special Operations University*



**“Joint SOF Education  
for the Long War”**

***BG Steven Hashem***  
***President***



# ***USSOCOM Vision***

---



**“To be the premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, properly equipped, and highly motivated: at the right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on Terrorism, accomplishing the strategic objectives of the United States.”**



# USSOCOM Vision



“To be the premier team of special warriors, ***thoroughly prepared***, properly equipped, and highly motivated: at the right place, at the right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on Terrorism, accomplishing the strategic objectives of the United States.”

**JSOU Mission: Provide education for Joint SOF**



# *Agenda*

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## **JSOU Mission Overview**


### **Warfighters Certificate Program**

### **Strategic Educational Engagement**





# *JSOU's Evolution*



- Phase I Start-up activity (completed)
- Phase II Implementing a Strategic Plan for SOF Education
- Phase III Optimization of the organization



# ***JSOU Mission***



- **Develop SOF and SOF Enablers for strategic and operational leadership**
- **Educate military and civilian professionals on the employment of SOF in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment**
- **Research and publish on national security issues critical to the SOF community**



# *Agenda*



## **JSOU Mission Overview**

**Warfighters Certificate Program**

**Strategic Educational Engagement**



# ***JSOWC Supports the JSOKCA JSOW***



## **JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS KEYSTONE CAPABILITY AREAS**

- Joint Expeditionary Special Operations Forces (JESOF)
- Joint Special Operations Warrior (JSOW)
- Joint Special Operations Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Information (JSOC4I)
- Joint Special Operations Logistics, Acquisition and Resourcing (JSOLAR)
- Joint Special Operations Intelligence (JSOI)





# ***JSOWC Relates to JSOW***



- **Develop an educational process to produce future Joint Special Operations Warrior who will be prepared for global expeditionary employment and with the ability to synchronize operational and strategic activities**
- Develop a prototype of the Joint SOF Warrior System, blending individual skills with the proper equipment, weapons, mobility, support, and communications systems
- Establish a process for Joint SOF human capital development
- Develop a Joint SOF "cradle to grave" career management system emphasizing selected educational, overseas and exchange or liaison assignments

## **JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS KEYSTONE CAPABILITY AREAS**

- Joint Expeditionary Special Operations Forces (JESOF)
- **Joint Special Operations Warrior (JSOW)**
- Joint Special Operations Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Information (JSOC4I)
- Joint Special Operations Logistics, Acquisition and Resourcing (JSOLAR)
- Joint Special Operations Intelligence (JSOI)



# ***Joint Special Operations Warfighters Certificate***



- **JSOWC program consists of 3 modules:**
  - **SOF Force Application and Strategy Course**
  - **Irregular Warfare Course**
  - **SOF Collaborative Planning Course**
- **Nominative course for mid-level officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs**
- **Goal: Prepare students for Joint Special Operations duty positions**

**Critical to developing Joint SOF Warriors**



# ***JSOWC Curriculum Overview***



## **Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate**

### **Module 1 (10 Days)**

#### **Joint SO Force Application and Strategy**

- National Policy
- Strategy Development
- Employment in Strategic Planning
- Centers of Gravities and Critical Factors
- Special Operations Forces Integration into Planning
- Evolution of Joint Special Operations Doctrine, Structure, and Functions
- Special Operations Forces C2 Structures and Functions
- Special Operations Forces Integration into Joint Targeting

### **Module 2 (10 Days)**

#### **Irregular Warfare**

- Introduction to Irregular Warfare
- Counter Insurgency and CT
- IW - The Indirect Approach
- IW - The Direct Approach
- Interagency Collaboration in IW
- Intelligence support to IW
- Civil Military Operations in support of IW
- Information Operations and PSYOP in IW

### **Module 3 (10 Days)**

#### **Joint SO Collaborative Planning**

- Doctrinal Basis for SOF Planning
- Operational Level Planning
- Planning Support Agencies and Activities
- Digital Planning and Collaborative Tools
- Instructor Facilitated Exercise
- Student Led Exercise

**Prerequisite - ISOF**



# ***Future Certificates***

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- **JSOWC success will provide foundation for additional certificate programs**
- **JSOKCA logical guide to future certificates:**
  - **Intelligence**
  - **Logistics**
  - **Command and Control**





# *Agenda*

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## **JSOU Mission Overview**

### **Warfighters Certificate Program**

### **Strategic Educational Engagement**



# ***Strategic Educational Engagement***

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- **International engagement via Special Operations Combating Terrorism Course**
- **Growing interagency educational program provides a domestic “engagement” with key partners in the interagency process**
- **Research, Publications, and Symposia provide both outreach and engagement on SOF topics**



# ***Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)***



- **Directly supports USSOCOM's international engagement initiatives**
- **Special Ops Combating Terrorism Course**
  - **Two SOCbT iterations -- Great success!**
  - **Students: 46 International and US SOF**
  - **Top-notch international and US instructors**
- **Strategic Engagement in FY07**
  - **Curriculum support to SOCCENT Annual Symposium in UAE**
  - **Regional programs for SOCPAC and SOCEUR**



# ***Interagency Educational Program***



- **Joint SOF Interagency Collaboration Course**
  - 3 iterations per FY in Washington and Tampa
- **New USSOCOM Interagency Taskings**
  - SOF Executive Interagency Seminar
  - SOF Interagency Support Team Preparation
  - IA Partner SOF Orientations

**In Concept Development**





# Last Words



**“Our commitment to this nation requires still more of our warriors. It requires a constant force evolution, not in response to our adversaries, but in advance of our adversaries.”**

**General Brown, CCSO 2006**

# *Joint Special Operations University*



**“Joint SOF Education  
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***BG Steven Hashem***  
***President***



# *Backup Slides*



# JSOF Leadership Competency Model







# Strategic Studies Division



## ■ Research and Publication

- Core Staff + Editor
- Annual Research Plan
- PME Students Papers
- Essay Contest

## ■ Education Engagement

- Annual Strategic Symposium
- Periodic Seminars & Workshops
- Senior Courses + War College Support
- Ties to Think Tanks, Academia, DoD's Regional Centers

## ■ Courses

- Joint SOF Pre-Command
- Terrorism Response Seminar
- SO Combating Terrorism
- SOF-Interagency Collaboration
- IA Course Cadre (in development)

## ■ Senior & Associate Fellows

Focused intellectual research & support across the spectrum



**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD  
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CENTER**



# **USCG - DEPLOYABLE OPERATIONS**



*Presentation to 18<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC  
Conference  
26 February 2007*



**Providing the Coast Guard with technology expertise and  
support for operational analysis and development.**



# SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES

$$E = mc^2$$

$$E = \mu\chi^2$$



# Conference Theme

- *Warfare in the Seams: Defense and Industry Partnering to Win the Long War*
- Transforming General Purpose Forces for Warfare in the Seams
  - *e.g., Training and Technology required to Conduct Military Operations in Cities, Mountainous Regions, Desert Terrain, and to Secure Long Borders from Hostile Incursions*





# CG Mission

- Safeguard lives, property and the environment from intentional and accidental maritime threats
- **Protect maritime mobility by eliminating interruptions and impediments to the economical movement of goods and people while maximizing the recreational use of the Nation's waterways.**
- **Secure maritime routes by halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens and other harmful/toxic contraband while preventing illegal incursions of our Economic Exclusion Zone thereby enforcing federal law.**
- Defend the nation as one of the five US Armed Services and enhance regional stability in support of the National Security Strategy.




# Threats & Challenges





# Threats & Challenges (cont.)


- Vessels carrying contraband
  - *WMDs, Explosives, Weapons, Drugs*
- Vessels as weapons
  - *Threat to other vessels and infrastructure*
- Vessels used to smuggle illegal aliens
  - *Go-fast boats, “put-puts” and containers*
- Vessel crews and passengers contain terrorists
  - *Ship jumpers*
- Underwater threats
  - *Swimmers, mines, explosives*







# Traffic Density




**Thousands of vessel “trips” in the AOR per week**





# Systems Approach


## OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE



- *System of systems approach to sensors, processing, correlation, analysis, decision and reaction systems*
  - Open architecture
  - Interoperable




# Technology Opportunities





# Boardings - CG Bread & Butter



Boarding Officer Bill/Betty

*Attain accurate accounts of material, personnel,  
etc. for vessel control issues and concerns*



# Deployable Specialized Forces

- Port Security Units (PSU)
- National Strike Force/Strike Teams
- Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLET)
- Maritime Safety & Security Teams (MSST)
- Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT)





# Deployable Specialized Forces

## Areas of Interest & Need

- Protective Equipment/Components
- Detection of Agents & Compounds of Interest
- Audio/Visual Tactical Sensing
- Lethal & Non Lethal Technologies
- Tactical Intelligence
- Biometrics
- Enhanced Strategic/Tactical Platform & Sensor Performance



# Deployable Specialized Forces

## *Related Needs*

- Weapons Proficiency
- Weapon Retention
- Close Quarters Battle
- Crowd Control
- Fire and Movement
- Site Security
- Moving Targets
- Assistance to other Emergency Responders
- Weapons Transition
- CBRNE Sampling, Monitoring
- CBRNE Evidence Collection
- Night / Low Light Engagement
- Self-Defense
- Vessel Operations
- Suspect Control
- Decontamination
- Communications
- Rescue
- CB Perimeter Characterization
- Unassisted Equipment Donning



# Deployable Specialized Forces

## Task/Skill

- Weapons Proficiency
- Weapon Retention
- Operating Equipment
- Close Quarters Battle
- Ground Fighting
- Fire & Movement
- Moving Targets
- Weapons Transition
- Night / Low-Light Engagement
- Self-Defense
- Suspect Detaining
- Site Security

## Integration Issue

- Dexterity / Tactility
- Weapon Aiming / Sighting
- Weapon Access
- Weapon Clearing / Reloading
- Durability
- Sustainability
- Ability to Communicate
- Visual Acuity
- Hearing Acuity
- Unassisted Equipment Donning
- Sustainability
- Monitoring of Individuals



# Deployable Specialized Forces

## Task/Skill

- Evacuation of Victims
- Decontamination of Self
- Decontamination of Equipment



## Integration Issue

- Limited Capability





# Prioritization of Integration Issues

- Sustainability of Wearer
- Communications & Interoperability
- Dexterity Issues
- Donning & Doffing of Equipment & Clothing
- Respirator interoperability/interchangeability
- Integration of equipment in CB ensembles
- Inability to characterize threats - real time
- “Frequency of Use” Analysis for load carriage
- Overall load carrying expectations
- Weapon sights/facemask compatibility



# Mission Profile Duration

<b>Mission Profile</b>	<b>Duration for CB Protection</b>
First Responder Perimeter Control	8 - 12 hours (min)
Tactical Operations	4 - 6 hours
HAZMAT	TBD
Emergent SAR	1 – 2 hours



# Technology Insertion Goals

- *Invest in products that address priority needs*
- *Develop “best” products as quickly as possible (triage/spiral approach)*
- *Help CG implement products*



# Program Evolution

- Spiral Development
  - *Build - Test - Build evolution over multiple years*
  - *Incorporate new sensors, technology and improvements*
  - *Conduct operationally assessments (Test beds)*

- First Spiral


- *Sensors at three ports*
- *Sector Command Center*
- *Web-Based Information Client*

- Second Spiral

- *Additional Long Range Radars*
- *Scene awareness*
- *Common operating picture integration*

- Follow-On Spirals


- *Wideband local communications*
- *OTH coastal area surveillance sensors*
- *Underwater object awareness*
- *Swimmer and vessel defense*








# Technology Community of Interest - Government





# Technology Community of Interest - Academia & Industry





# ***Jack McCready***

***Manager, Deployable Ops & INTEL Pgms***

***USCG - R&D Center***

***1082 Shennecossett Rd.***

***Groton, CT 06340-6096***

***voice: (860-441-2738)***

***fax: (860-441-2792)***

***email: Jack.W.McCready@uscg.mil***



## **LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNION: Why the DOD-DI relationship is best left at home**

### **Opening**

The historical relationship between the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and the American Defense Industry (DI) has been an extremely positive one. Images of the great material production of WWII spring immediately to mind. More recently, the great technological innovations made possible by the relationship between the DOD and DI have led to super offensive weapons, and life-saving defensive armament that have no global equivalent. Historically this has been a relationship limited to the physical boundaries of the United States; the direct projection of that material into combat has always been the strict province of the United States Government. Then came 9-11, the Global War on Terror, and a greater demand for personnel than our government agencies could provide.

Unfortunately, our national experiment to project the DI directly into combat zones has proven not nearly as effective as the historical relationship. Forced out of a sense of national security that demanded emergent action, the United States has attempted to extend the DOD-DI relationship into areas where it does not work effectively. In fact, the extension of the DI directly into contested areas of battle space has been at times counter-productive. The images of the DOD-DI today do not conjure up images of B-17s on assemblage lines, but rather, those of American civilians killed or captured while going to work.

The conclusion of this paper—that American citizen contractors should not be permitted in US designated combat areas—is not new; however, the lines of reasoning are unique. Other arguments decry the nation's use of private contractors in order to support a wider anti-war agenda, to loft criticism on the current administration, or as a rejection of our national strategic aims. This discussion is different; it is a proposal to end the use of contractors because their combat zone presence is eminently harmful to the projection of U.S. power. In other words, our ability to reach national strategic ends is hampered by the deployment of American citizen-contractors. To support that claim, this paper investigates the three areas which are most severely affected by the forward presence of the DOD-DI relationship: strategic objectives, ethical means, and Constitutional considerations.

### **Part I: OBJECTIVE DIFFERENCES**

The strategic objectives of the Department of Defense and those of the Defense Industry are radically different. The DOD is charged with fighting and winning the nation's wars to ensure the security of the country and its citizens. The various companies that make up the Defense Industry are charged with increasing the wealth of their shareholders. This is not a slight or a criticism of the Defense Industry; it is simply reality, and normally a very positive attribute of the American free market system. Arguably, it was the American free-market system and its ability to *produce* that was chiefly responsible for U.S. victories in the two global conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Clearly the differences in strategic objectives did not harm the nation's ability to pursue national objectives in



the past, so why the problem now? In the past, American companies and employees did not venture into active combat zones. It is precisely there, beyond the acceptable limitations of DOD and DI union, that the differences in objective create friction.

Even with strategic differences, the connection between DOD and DI in a peacetime environment is symbiotic; the growth and success of one supports the same in the other. When the relationship is extended spatially into an environment of sustained active combat—war by any label—it is more correctly termed syncretism. That is, the attempted union or fusion of two radically different philosophies. Beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) or within the designated Area of Operations (AO) the DOD is focused on pursuing lines of operations to ensure strategic victory. The DOD is not primarily concerned with the monetary cost; profit, market share, and quarterly earning do not figure into the decision making of military commanders. For those companies of the DI that deploy shoulder to shoulder with the military, such things do matter. In terms of national blood and treasure, if a DOD operation suddenly turns out to be more costly than expected, a change in operational objectives might be in order to reach the strategic ends. Perhaps more resources are required to overcome a tougher than expected adversary. The point is, the strategic ends remain the same—fight and win the nation's wars. When an American company finds the expenses greater than expected, the result is quite different: they leave. They can leave because *their success* is not tied to American foreign policy pursuits, and because it is not their duty or responsibility to ensure national security. Again, this characterization is not intended to color the DI as unpatriotic or greedy, but simply to explain the natural tension created when the free market enters a combat zone.

The different strategic objective between DOD and the DI leads directly to problems in sustaining a unity of effort. The reasons are quite apparent. The DOD can undertake a civic project, a military objective, or a governmental activity and see it through to completion regardless of the costs. So long as the national leadership is willing to pursue policy aims and national interests, the DOD can continue to dedicate resources to the effort. The DI simply can't work along similar lines. Regardless of the national interests at stake, at some point the danger to company employees becomes too great. At some point the lack of future profits becomes too debilitating. At some point the company shareholders become too disgusted at the loss in share price. In short, when the country pursues national interests through military force, the DOD can withstand changes in environment, military setbacks, and increasing monetary costs. Companies within the DI can't. When the DOD relies on such companies to fulfill supporting roles inside the contested battle space, and those companies can not sustain the effort and choose to exit the arena, the efforts of the DOD and the entire United States Government are undermined.

Foreign populations aren't concerned with the differences in strategic objective. Point of fact: when the United States Government promises to provide security, clean the water, turn on the power, or repair the communications grid, foreign audiences don't differentiate between American government officials and American citizens working for DI companies. In the eyes of affected citizenry, both are efforts under the auspice of the

USG. When a project fails or a promise goes undelivered, the blame falls on the country not the company. Unity of effort is substantially more important than the potential efficiency of the free market in counterinsurgency and nation-building environments.

## **Part II: ETHICAL MEANS**

The United State's use of private contractors in the battle space of the current conflict undermines America's strategic requirement to gain ethical dominance. To effectively engage the enemies confronting the United States in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), in the environments where they exist, requires a national and international debate on the ethical, military means allowable. The United States finds itself fighting an enemy that is not only comprised of trans-national networks, but that also surrounds and embeds itself into local communities. These are organizations that wear no uniforms or distinctive markings, avoid direct confrontation with military forces, and openly advertise collateral damage as a propaganda tool against their adversaries. In short, these are enemy organizations that are using the very concepts of western, Just War discourse as strategic advantage. By wrapping a community of supporters around their organizations, they effectively create safe areas that can not be engaged. Or at least they couldn't be engaged in the past.

Current events make it increasingly apparent that the United States and her allies will, at some point, be forced to take the fight directly to the communities that support our adversaries. Recent campaigns and conflicts have demonstrated the strength of such community-based organizations. The failed Israeli attack on Hezbollah positions in the summer of 2006, the repeated failure of the Pakistani government to control North Waziristan, and the growing threat of the Sadr militia in Baghdad are all examples of what doesn't work to thwart this new type of threat organization. Something else is in order; a new means for attacking the threat where it lives, and the ethical clarity that it is they--the terrorists--who are responsible for collateral damage and death, not us. Such clarity is not possible when we, too, have non-uniformed civilians pursuing political objectives in the battle space.

To ensure national security, the United States will be forced to attack terrorist organizations in their community defenses. The only way this can be done successfully is to make the ethical case that such action is defensive, that the terrorists who seek refuge in those areas are illegal combatants, and that the unavoidable death to innocents is the responsibility of the terrorists, not the United States. American leaders can only make this case by invoking the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Geneva protocols, and by citing the illegality in the actions of the terrorists themselves. Specifically, illegal acts concerning the lack of uniforms and markings, the intentional endangerment of non-combatants and innocents, and the militarization of sites that are protected from military retaliation. Before the nation can do this; however, requires that we first clean our own house. We can no longer allow American companies and their American citizen employees to move about the battlefield, armed or unarmed, in the pursuit of political objectives. We can no longer rely on private security companies to

protect logistical trains or supply depots. We can no longer accept that the DOD must be supplemented with private industry within contested battle space. This goes beyond the relevant issues of how to protect and punish individual DI employees. The argument here is that the use of American private citizens in this manner necessarily restricts the means available to the DOD. The United States can not make an effective ethical case for engaging illegal combatants when our own nation employs civilian contractors to support the physical acts of war.

The ethical realm makes for a very stark national decision. If the nation continues current practice, and continues to employ DI private companies and American citizens, then we as a nation either restrict the available options to the DOD or we face the certain charges of hypocrisy and tyranny by the international community. However, by ending the practice; by limiting the cooperation of DOD and DI to sovereign areas of stability, the nation is freed from our self-imposed restraints so that we might effectively take the fight to the enemy--where he lives. It is possible to both remain true to our ethical standards for prosecuting war and to also decisively engage terrorist communities, but the nation must first remove our own citizens from the battlefield.

### **Part III: CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS**

The use of DI companies and contractors in the current battle space is not the result of an evil conspiracy between national leaders and private industry. It is the result of pragmatic decisions made with an eye on short-term efficiencies. The DOD simply did not have the personnel, numbers or expertise, to immediately launch into a conflict spread across the globe, and one which required multiple campaigns featuring nation-building efforts. While the current situation is understandable—a nation does go to war with the team it has—the Constitutional concerns that the DOD-DI relationship raises must be reflected on. The very way in which we have supplemented the DOD to pursue political objectives is Constitutionally questionable.

The founding fathers considered war to be a serious issue, but one that would have to be pursued from time to time. As such, the framers built checks on the power of the branches to pursue war. The Constitution is very clear on the subject; it provides exceptional executive powers to the President during times of war, and it provides legislative checks on the executive's power to pursue policy aims through war. Specifically, the legislature is given the responsibility to raise, fund and maintain the separate military services. Inherent in this responsibility, is the power to limit or grow the size of the services through funding.

The use of private companies and citizens to supplement the DOD is a Constitutional issue because it erodes the power of the legislature to “raise and support” the services. While the Congress still approves the budget, the services can use discretionary funds, and purchase capabilities through DI contracts. Supplemental bills provide additional funds for contracting at the discretion of the DOD. This all adds up to a DOD that remains strategically unequipped to prosecute the conflict at hand, while the missing ingredients are continuously provided by the DI directly into the battle space. In so

doing, the services themselves assume the responsibility to “raise and support”. The DOD is an agency of the executive, and, therefore, does not have the Constitutional authority to raise and support itself. The executive branch, through the use of DI contracts, has obtained power not granted to it. Furthermore, the continued erosion of the legislative ‘check’ on the executive’s power to pursue war is unhealthy for the nation. The DOD projection of DI companies and employees into combat zones is uncomfortably close to becoming, in a word, unconstitutional.

To be clear, this is not a rebuke of the President or a free-pass for the Congress. It is the legislature’s responsibility to uphold their Constitutional duties, not the other branches of government. Constitutionally, the legislature does not have the option of allowing the services to grow themselves or to supplement their own capabilities through the DI. They, the United States Congress, are fully responsible for such decisions, and it is they who must fulfill that role.

## **THE REASONS WHY**

In light of the current political climate, it is critical to point out what this argument is not. It is not a rebuke or a critique of those American citizens who are working as private industry contractors. Too often these people are portrayed as nothing short of mercenaries; not true. Many are decorated military veterans, and almost all personally support the national objectives that they help pursue. Nor is this an argument against the Defense Industry or the companies that comprise it. The United States simply couldn’t pursue its many national interests without the American defense industry and the free market that it operates in. When the DI is limited physically to operating exclusively outside of U.S. combat areas, the relationship between the DI and the DOD is an incredibly useful instrument of national power. Finally, this is not a criticism of the U.S. government for allowing the DOD-DI relationship to blow past its functional limitations into the physically contested areas of the GWOT. National leaders did what they thought had to be done in order to execute the national strategy. The limited resources and capabilities to execute the GWOT required emergency action. What is important now is to recognize the limitations of the DOD-DI relationship, and to take the necessary corrective actions.

## **CLOSING RECOMMENDATIONS**

Clearly, it is time to move the DI back into a more positive relationship with the DOD. To do this, the DI must be restricted to the physical space outside of all U.S. declared combat areas. This includes not only companies and citizens working with the DOD, but those contractors working with any agency of the United States Government (USG). In short, all Americans working in combat areas should work for, and be employed by, the USG. This would ensure a unity of effort, at least within agencies, that we do not currently possess. Similarly, by restricting the DI from combat zones, the nation is more able to employ the necessary military means to engage an enemy that employs human camouflage. To destroy terrorist organizations, the United States is going to require the moral courage and standing to declare such terrorists ‘illegal combatants’, and to raid the



communities that they hide within. Finally, it has been over five years since the USG required emergency action to engage the immediate threat. The Constitutional concerns raised by employing private companies and contractors should be put to rest. The sustainability of our national strategy demands this.

The need for corrective action is not completely unnoticed or unrecognized. One of the most underreported elements within the President's State of the Union Address in January 2007, is also the most germane to this argument. The President briefly mentioned a State Department initiative called the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). This initiative would provide on-demand experts that could supplement national efforts as *working representatives of the USG*. While the initiative is limited in scope, similar initiatives spread across the wealth of governmental agencies could provide the enhanced capabilities that we currently seek out through the DI. This is a project worthy of national attention and resources. In fact, it is precisely through the DI that the nation can expect to find the valuable personnel, as well as the responsible companies, that would provide the bodies for the CRC.

What is most required at this time is a national recognition of the problem. The DI-DOD relationship has historical significance, and is one of the primary reasons the United States emerged from the 20<sup>th</sup> century as the world's sole superpower. The American free market, and the defense industry it created, is a positive for American power and national security. However, the leap of this relationship into the physical battle space of the GWOT has come with a cost. Instead of the efficiency that we normally think inherent of free market systems, the spatial transition of the DI into active war zones has led to strategic inefficiency. By limiting the physical presence of the DI, and by increasing the capabilities of USG agencies including the DOD, the U.S. can better pursue the necessary national objectives that we have laid out before us.

Joe McGraw  
MAJ, NPS  
Defense Analysis Department



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **Cyber-Herding:**

### **Exploiting Islamic Extremists Use of the Internet**

by

David B. Moon, Capt, USAF  
Joint Information Operations Student  
Department of Defense Analysis

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position, or endorsement of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Special Operations Command, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Additionally, the author of this paper has no knowledge of any public or private agencies, organizations, groups, or individuals engaged in cyber-herding as described in this paper or any similar activities. It is entirely possible that some entity is engaged in cyber-herding or similar activities, but this author could not find any evidence in the public record to indicate anyone is practicing cyber-herding.

## **Introduction:**

On November 28, 2006, the Al-Fajr Information Center released the first issue of the *Technical Mujahid Magazine*.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of the online magazine is to help prevent aggressive acts against Muslims in cyberspace and to assist the mujahid in their efforts.<sup>2</sup> A mujahid is a Muslim fighting in a war or involved in any other struggle.<sup>3</sup> The magazine proclaims that the Internet provides a golden opportunity for the mujahid to break the Western media control over information. The magazine also recognizes that the internet could represent a vulnerability to the mujahid and suggests security measures for the mujahid to follow. The magazine is correct when they say this is a golden opportunity for the mujahid. The internet provides Islamic extremists an excellent medium to spread their ideas to billions of people, and over the years, the extremists have steadily made a greater presence on the information superhighway. As an example, Gabriel Weimann states that from 1998 to the present, "the number of terrorists' websites has grown from less than 30 to more

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<sup>1</sup> <http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD137506>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen>

than 4,300.”<sup>4</sup> Islamic extremists have used these websites for recruitment, fundraising, coordination, training, propaganda, and a whole host of different activities.

While all of these activities service Islamic extremists’ multiple interest, the spreading of their propaganda is perhaps the most dangerous. Over the years, these extremists have learned to shape their messages to appeal to Muslim audiences. Muslims receive messages from the extremists pointing out the unfair policies of the West against Muslim countries, how the West blindly supports Israel against the “poor” Palestinian people, and the West’s’ attempts to control the Muslim world. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have only added fuel to this message. The extremists have used these conflicts to reshape their messages by showing the West attacking and occupying two Muslim countries. There is fertile ground in the Muslim world for messages of this nature, as evidenced by the following selections from the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s report on *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other*.<sup>5</sup>


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<sup>4</sup> Weimann, G. (2006). *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*. Pg 15, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.

<sup>5</sup> <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=831>




## Negative Characteristics Associated with Westerners (Muslim Respondents)



Lighter shading indicates Muslim subpopulations in Western European countries.  
In Pakistan, the percentage of Don't Know/Refuse responses ranges from 28% to 42% on these characteristics.

## Positive Characteristics Associated with Westerners (Muslim Respondents)



Lighter shading indicates Muslim subpopulations in Western European countries.  
In Pakistan, the percentage of Don't Know/Refuse responses ranges from 26% to 36% on these characteristics.

Figure 1

The results from the Muslims interviewed reveal a very negative image of the West. Islamic extremists shape their messages to reinforce this negative view. What can be done to counter these messages? The first step is to understand the medium that the extremists are using.

The internet has many characteristics that support extremists' information operations, such as being able to reach large audiences. Yet the internet also has inherent weaknesses that can be exploited. One of these weaknesses is the ambiguous nature of the net. You trust that when you go to a website that it is legitimate. If it looks professional, you tend to believe that the site is real. However, criminals or terrorists could just as easily be running that website. The same is true when you chat with someone online. They could be who they say they are, but they could just as easily be someone else pretending to be the person you want them to be. A group called "Perverted Justice," as featured on Dateline NBC, has made great success in catching child predators by using the internet's ambiguous nature.<sup>6</sup> Terrorist organizations also have an inherent weakness that can be exploited using the internet. This weakness is the decentralized nature of terrorist

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<sup>6</sup> <http://www.perverted-justice.com/>

organizations. Many terrorist organizations that do not have state sponsorship organize and accomplish work utilizing social networks versus a hierarchy command structure. This only makes sense. Individuals engaged in criminal activities need to work with people they trust so they can accomplish their mission. In the physical world, social networks are very reliable. However, in the virtual world social networks can be exploited because personalities in the virtual world can be real or fictitious. In order to exploit these weaknesses, a cyber system that invisibly drives Islamic extremists from terrorist websites to covertly controlled websites can be developed. I will generically refer to this system as cyber-herding.<sup>7</sup>

**Defining Cyber-herding:**

Cyber-herding is the action by which an individual, group, or organization drives individuals, groups, or organizations to a desired location within the electronic realm. Why implement cyber-herding versus engaging in an all out war on extremist websites? The answer to that

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<sup>7</sup> Author's note: While discussing this idea with Prof John Arquilla from the Naval Postgraduate School, he applied the term cyber-herding to this concept. The term stuck and this author has been applying it to this concept ever since. Cyber-herding can also be found on the internet in reference to cattle herding, which has nothing to do with the ideas in this paper.

question lies in the realm of intelligence gathering and in the freedom of the internet. While the threat from Islamic extremists' use of the internet is high, intelligence agencies have successfully harvested information from these sites. Thus, an all-out denial-of service attack on extremists' websites would limit intelligence agencies capability to gather information. Indeed, some extremists' websites have been actively targeted and shut down. However, the problem that emerges from this tactic is the freedom of the internet allows extremists to restore or relocate their websites in a matter of hours to days. Thus, these attacks could embolden the extremists by reinforcing the fact that they can set up a new site within a short period. Simply stated, the attacks and subsequent re-emergence could provide them with a simple affirmation: *The powerful United States tries to keep us off the internet but they cannot!* On the other hand, cyber-herding has the potential to covertly neutralize undesirable websites, mine data from controlled websites, map virtual social networks, manipulate extremist messages, and modify the extremists' story. To implement a cyber-herding program effectively, a minimum of four nodes are required.



### **Objectives of the Cyber-herding Nodes:**




Figure 2

#### **The Gatherer Node:**

The gatherer node's objective is to compile and maintain an up to date list for all extremists related uses of the internet.

#### **The Network Node:**

The members of the network node have two objectives. The first objective is to insert themselves into the extremists' virtual social network. The second objective is to identify major "hubs" and "links" within the extremists' virtual social network.

#### **The Construction Node:**

The members of the construction node have two objectives. The first objective is to create realistic doppelganger extremists websites and chat rooms. A doppelganger refers

to a ghostly double or a look alike. In some traditions, it is an omen of death to see your own doppelganger. The second objective is to create several content rich Darknet environments that offer e-mail, file sharing, chat, instant messenger, and streaming video services. A Darknet is a private virtual network where users connect only to people they trust.<sup>8</sup>

#### **The Demolition Node:**

The demolition node's objective is to remotely destroy or disable all extremists' websites, chat rooms, Darknets, etc.

#### **The Cyber-herding Process:**

##### **Phase One:**

The gatherer node begins the cyber-herding process by tracking down extremists' websites and chat rooms. To facilitate this process, the node seeks public help by placing web-based advertisements asking people to submit Uniform Resource Locators (URL) for any suspected extremist website.<sup>9</sup> The node seeks out help from private groups such as the Rand Corporation, the Search for International Terrorist (SITE) Institute, and the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and academic terrorism research

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<sup>8</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet>

<sup>9</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL>

groups.<sup>10,11,12</sup> The node compiles a list of extremist website URLs. This list becomes a living document that the node constantly updates with identified extremists' sites. In addition, a program constantly checks identified URLs to verify the sites are still active and automatically deletes dead sites. During this process, the network node makes a copy of the list, and begin phase two.

#### **Phase Two:**

Upon accessing a site on the list, the members of the network node pose as Islamic extremist sympathizers and/or supporters and begin interacting with members of the site. In chat rooms, the node members start or join conversations supporting extremists themes. The objective is to develop trust relationships with Islamic extremists. Node members contact extremists' websites to see what they can do to support the cause. If needed, the network node would have the authority to make small donations to extremists websites to help build trust. During this phase, the network node maps the extremists' chat rooms. Mapping a chat room involves creating a social network diagram of who is talking to whom within the chat room. The members of the network node are looking for "hubs"

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.rand.org/about/>

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.siteinstitute.org/index.html>

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.memri.org/>

using the sites. These hubs are people who have more connections than anyone else. Malcolm Gladwell in his book, *"The Tipping Point,"* refers to these people as "connectors."<sup>13</sup>

The members of the network node develop virtual fictitious identities. They keep detailed records of their conversations for each identity. This way any member of the network node can be that virtual person. All they have to do is pick a character, and read up on his or her history before chatting.

If the network node discovers any websites not identified on the list, they will update the master list with the new URLs and forward these sites to the gatherer node. The members of network node mark the list to identify sites they are currently working, this ensures the demolition node does not destroy a site the network node is currently operating in. Subsequently, the network node forwards the list to the construction node.

### **Phase Three:**

After the members of construction node receive the list from the network node, they start accessing the sites.

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<sup>13</sup> Gladwell, M. (2002). *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.



They copy the websites content, format, graphics, files, and links. Using this information, the construction node builds doppelganger extremists' websites. All website created should be independent sites, with only passing similarities with other existing websites. At no time will the construction node hijack an existing extremist website as this could cause distrust in the target audience.<sup>14</sup> The construction node forwarded all created sites to the network node. The members of the network node endorse these new websites with their contacts. The members of construction node remove all websites the network node marked and any sites they created from the list. Afterwards, the construction node forwards the list to the demolition node.

#### **Phase Four:**

After receiving the list from the construction node, the demolition node systematically begins a process of attacking every site on the list. These attacks can be simple such as contacting the sites service provider to protest the site to try to get the site removed. They can also use more sophisticated attacks such as denial of service attacks, hijacking a website, Structured Query Language (SQL) injections, Cross Site Scripting cookie

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<sup>14</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Page\\_hijacking](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Page_hijacking)

stealing, JavaScript injections, and other hacking methods.<sup>15,16</sup> Depending on where the host server is located, it may not be politically feasible to attack some sites directly. In these cases, the demolition node could post the extremists' URLs on internet chat rooms and blogs in the hope that private citizens and/or groups can bring down the sites.

Using the sparse numbers on extremists' websites in Gabriel Weimann's book, *Terror on the Internet*, I have created a mathematic model; see attachment 1, to determine the growth rate of extremists' websites.<sup>17</sup> Utilizing math modeling, I estimated the rate of growth for extremists' websites on the internet is, at least, 2.33 websites a day. At this rate of growth, I have estimated that the total number of extremists' websites ending in 2006 is approximately 6,850 websites. Using this knowledge, the construction node needs to take down at least 2.33 websites a day just to maintain the status quo. But, maintaining the status quo is not the objective.

Going back to math modeling, I estimated parity is achievable in 711 days if the demolition node can take down

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.loriswebs.com/hijacking\\_web\\_pages.html](http://www.loriswebs.com/hijacking_web_pages.html)

<sup>16</sup>

<http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:uXBMKQ2TURkJ:milw0rm.com/papers/111+attacking+websites+methods&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=9>

<sup>17</sup> Weimann, G. (2006). *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*. Pg 15, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.

an average of nine websites a day and the construction node can build websites at an average of 2.33 websites a day. This is illustrated in figure 3 below. Once parity is achieved, phase five begins.




Figure 3

#### Phase Five:

The purpose of phase five is to change the message. Think of the Islamic extremists' as salesmen. They are selling their ideology to the world. As good salesmen, they highlight the positive qualities of their movement, and suppress negative qualities of their movement. The two main items Islamic extremists suppress is the violence they commit, and their desire to impose their harsh version of an Islamic state upon people, states, and nations. Virtually all internet Islamic extremists expound about the

need for an Islamic state. For them, an Islamic state would solve all of the world's problems. However, none of them actually describes what an Islamic state would look like or how it would function. Extremists' violence and desire for an Islamic state are weaknesses that phase five exploits. During phase five, the construction node will make subtle changes to the websites under their control to highlight violent acts committed by extremists. In the view of most Muslims, Islam is the religion of peace. To them, the association of violence and Islam is a contradiction. By focusing on the violent acts committed by Islamic extremists in the name of Allah, support for the extremists should wane within the Muslim community. The construction node will also start to describe what an Islamic state will look like and how it will function. However, each site will have a different version of what an Islamic state will look like. Some sites will focus on installing an Islamic Caliphate, while others will focus on national Islamic states.<sup>18</sup> The Caliphate is an Islamic federal government that represents both political leadership and unities of the Muslim world applying Islamic

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[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate#Reestablishment\\_of\\_a\\_modern\\_Caliphate](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate#Reestablishment_of_a_modern_Caliphate)



law know as Shariah law.<sup>19</sup> As there is no set Shariah law recognized by all Muslims, each site would have its own version of Shariah law that will be enforced under the Islamic state.<sup>20</sup> The sites will also highlight the role of women in an Islamic state, rights of non-Muslims, and punishments for violating Shariah law. The purpose of all of this is to let potential supporters of the sites know what they are getting into. An Islamic state may sound like a good idea to many Muslims. However, once these Muslims come to understand the details of an Islamic state, they may start questioning if it really is a good idea after all. In addition, by attaching different versions of an Islamic state to different extremist groups should foster hostilities between these groups. This should help keep the different factions from uniting to achieve their goals.

#### **Phase Six:**

Going back to math modeling, by day 1,032 virtually all of the extremists' websites could potentially be eliminated. At this time, the construction node would stop making new websites. The demolition node will continue to attack any identified Islamic extremists' sites.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid

<sup>20</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shariah>

Additionally, the demolition node will start to shut down construction node sites at the same rate they were attacking the extremists websites. At this pace, all websites will be eliminated by day 1375. I recommend that on day 1369, the demolition node stop shutting down sites created by the construction node. This will leave approximately 50 sites in operation for monitoring, and message control. This is illustrated in figure 4 below. The demolition node will continue to attack any extremists' website that makes it on the list.




Figure 4

#### **Phase Seven:**

During this phase, the construction node will develop content rich Darknet environments. As stated earlier, a Darknet is a virtual private network where users connect

only to people they trust.<sup>21</sup> These Darknet environments will offers e-mail, file sharing, chat, instant messenger, and streaming video services. Once a Darknet is created, the construction node will send the URL to the network node.

The members of network node will pick a connector with which they have developed a strong trust relationship, and invite that connector to become a member of the Darknet. This invitation will come in the form of three emails: one containing the URL of the site, one containing a temporary username, and one containing a temporary password. When the connector clicks on the URL, a website will open. The only thing on this website is two fields for a username and a password and a submit button. When the connector fills in the fields and clicks the submit button, a prompt will appear requesting the user to establish a new username and password. Once the connector establishes a new username and password, a welcome message will appear. The welcome message informs the user that he is entering a secure website developed to promote the Islamic extremists' causes, and he was chosen to have access to the site because of his faith and dedication. The message will also tell the connector that he can invite

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<sup>21</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet>

up to 10 people to join the website, but he must only invite people he trusts 100 percent. The purpose of this message is to make the subject feel special for being chosen, and to make the subject feel secure.

If the connector likes the website, then he may chose to invite others. On the other hand, if he does not like the website, then the network node will have to start over with a new connector. Anyone invited to join the network will go through the same process as the connector. Using small-world theory, the network node can have extremists build a detailed map of their virtual social network.<sup>22</sup> Psychologist Stanley Milgram illustrates this theory in his 1967 study in which he showed that no less than six people separate people from each other.<sup>23</sup> The Six degrees of Kevin Bacon game also illustrates this theory, in which the game's objective is to connect any Hollywood actor with Kevin Bacon within six associations.<sup>24</sup>

As people join the Darknet, a computer program constructs a social network map showing the connections between the individuals and people that invited them to join the network. The program also updates the map whenever users send e-mails from their Darknet e-mail

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<sup>22</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small\\_world\\_phenomenon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_world_phenomenon)

<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six\\_Degrees\\_of\\_Kevin\\_Bacon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon)



account, and chat with other Darknet users. Additionally, the Darknet runs IP and e-mail tracking software against all users. This software provides geographical locations for the users IP addresses and e-mail. In addition, the software provides contact information on the person that owns the IP address, and contact information on the person's host service provider. The social network map incorporates all of this information. The map can be used to identify geographical clusters within the network, links between clusters, and vital network hubs that can be targeted for human intelligence surveillance. If multiple users are accessing the Darknet using the same computer, this may show a possible headquarters for extremists groups that can be targeted for human intelligence. Another benefit of the Darknet is the ability to mine data from Darknet e-mail accounts, file sharing, and chat room conversations.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data\\_mining](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_mining)




Figure 5

### Limits of Cyber-Herding:

The major limitation of cyber-herding is language fluency. Every node involved in this process will need to be multilingual, with a focus on Arabic. Before the process can begin, an investment must be made into recruiting people fluent in Arabic and training people in the Arabic language. The other limitation is time. Cyber-herding is not a quick easy fix. It will take time to develop trust relationships and attack offensive websites. The last limitation is in changing the message. The construction node can make subtle changes to the extremists

message by highlighting weakness in Islamic extremists themes, however cyber-herding cannot be used to try to change people's beliefs about America or the West. Any attempt to go down that path will lead to failure.

**Conclusion:**

The internet provides Islamic extremists a golden opportunity to bypass normal media outlets, and take their message directly to the people. This allows them to spread their ideas to an ever-growing audience. Utilizing the cyber-herding process, extremists' information operations can be taken over and their messages and ideas can be modified to make them less appealing to their target audiences. Cyber-herding also increases monitoring and data collection of Islamic extremist information operations. Those willing to make cyber-herding a reality can seize the golden opportunity away from the Islamic extremists and make it their own.

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- <http://www.rand.org/about/>
- <http://www.siteinstitute.org/index.html>
- [http://www.loriswebs.com/hijacking\\_web\\_pages.html](http://www.loriswebs.com/hijacking_web_pages.html)
- <http://www.perverted-justice.com/>

<http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:uXBMKQ2TURkJ:milw0rm.com/papers/111+attacking+websitemethods&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=9>





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# **“Perspectives on Special Operations and Warfare in the Seams”**

**Tom O’Connell**  
**Assistant Secretary of Defense**  
**NDIA SO/LIC Symposium**  
**28 Feb, 2007**



# Thank-yous are in order.....

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- Thanks to the NDIA SO/LIC Board
- Thanks to Industry/Government Exhibitors for their investment in the Symposium
- Thanks to the superb members of SOF
- Thanks to the Industry innovators
- Special thanks to TSWG/CTTSO (More Later)



# US Special Operations Command



## US Army Special Operations Command

Special Forces  
Rangers  
160<sup>th</sup> SOAR  
Psychological  
Operations  
Civil Affairs Operations



## Air Force Special Operations Command

Fixed Wing Special Opns  
Aviation  
Rotary Wing Special Opns  
Aviation  
Special Tactics units



## Naval Special Warfare Command

SEALs  
SEAL Delivery Vehicle  
Teams  
Special Boat Units



## Joint Special Operations Command

Ensures SOF  
Interoperability;  
Conducts Joint Studies,  
Training, and Operations



## Marine Special Operations Command

MSOBs  
FMTU  
MSOSG  
MSOS



# MARSOC Mission Statement

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U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), as the U.S. Marine Corps component of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), trains, organizes, equips; and when directed by CDRUSSOCOM, deploys task organized, scaleable, and responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide in support of combatant commanders and other agencies.



# Issues-SOF



- SOCOM –Great Success in QDR-QDR Falls Short of Required Defense Capacity. Forces ARE Stressed.
- Industry Partnership-Support for the SOF Community has been superb.
- ISR, TT&L, Sensors-Persistent Surveillance is Critical.
- Exploitation-Remote Interrogation, Rapid DOCEX, Lightweight Power
- Recapitalization of Fixed Wing Fleet-Complex Issue
- Foreign SOF Interface and Surrogates-Counter/Network
- New Models of Success-JTF HOA, JIATF-S, W, JTF-P





# Issues for SOF

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- We cannot be victims of Interagency Turf Struggles. Suggest reading Title 10 of the US Code. Results in Delay of Critical Authorities.
- Personal Conduct of SOF is Explosive Issue (Front Page/Back Page)
- SOF Stations-Key Countries-Should be a standing, funded organization
- Global SOF Posture-European Stability



# A Nation at War ?



- **Election Approaching -18 Months of Potential “Silly Season”**
- **Resources constrained??- Heritage 4% Solution (GDP)**
- **Public Opinion – Less Certain**





# A Nation at War



- **Fighting two COINs/  
Shooting Wars**
- **Trying to transform  
force**
- **Cold War Authorities  
and Mindset**





# A Nation at War




- **Ever Increasingly Hostile Media (Domestic)**



- **Openly Hostile Foreign Media**



- **Energy Uncertainty**





# A Nation at War



- **Pandemic uncertainty, Border Demands**
- **Growing Islamic population growing in frustration**
- **WMD within constant reach of the enemy**







# A Nation at War



- An enemy adept at information technology tools
- War in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to foster view that USA is anti-Islamic
- Enemy's perspective of a circa 1500 Caliphate is real





# A Nation at War



- **Al Qa'ida has stated their four major objectives (all are clear and resonate within the Islamic World)**
- **Moderate voices not calling out**
- **New Intel Laws – New Organizations**  
**SOCOM'S CSO– NCTC**  
**JIOCs-JIATFs-DNI**





# ***Global War on Terrorism: A War Unlike Any Other***

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- In the war on terrorism, our enemies operate globally from:
  - States in which we have active military operations.
  - States that are not at war with us.
  - Ungoverned areas such as failed and failing states.
- While the U.S. has the finest military forces in the world, many GWOT tasks can be accomplished better by and with partner nations because they know the local geography, language, and culture.
- Building partnership security capacity enables our partners to:
  - Disrupt terrorist and criminal activity.
  - Meet common threats.
  - Fight alongside of us or instead of us.



## ***Building Partnership Capacity: Cold War Constructs-Outdated and Inflexible***

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- Existing Cold War tools for building partnership capacity were primarily designed for:
  - Increasing U.S. influence in countries, rather than building their capacity to contribute to the defeat of a common enemy.
  - Building forces to defend against a conventional threat.
  - Measuring quantities of equipment sold and men trained, rather than tangible contributions to U.S. national security.
- This is 2007, not 1947. Interagency needs restructuring
- NSC Staff could benefit from Goldwater-Nichols approach.
- SOCOM has been a model for interagency efficiency.
- What about a Deputy Secretary for Interagency Affairs? Present at EEOB and National Security Advisor with an IT reach-back capability.



# ***Why the QDR Falls Short-***

- 
- **We are driven by budget rather than military considerations**
  - **Few realize the true impact of inattention in the 1990's**
  - **Operational Tempo way up, yet total force is half the size of 1992**
  - **Average aircraft age now 24 years.....in 1973, it was 9. Older platforms strain readiness, increase inventory costs**
  - **DoD's rush to meet budget targets causes us to cut back and therefore increase production costs in the long run.**
  - **Years of uncertainty have shrunk the defense industry...more mergers, more sole source contracts, less research and therefore higher costs.**

**Sen. Jim Talent-Heritage**





# Section 1206 Authority: What It Does and Does Not Do



- **Section 1206 *does*:**
  - Give DoD a 2-year \$200M (per year) train and equip authority.
  - Require that DoD jointly formulate programs and coordinate implementation with State.
  - Allow DoD to build the capacity of a foreign country's military forces to conduct time-sensitive:
    - A. Counter-terrorism or counter-terrorism WMD-proliferation operations; or
    - B. Stability operations in which US forces are a participant.
  - Require a Presidential review of the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act, due at the end of FY06 (SEP 06).
  - Expire on 30 September 2007 -- though could be renewed and even expanded if the Executive Branch demonstrates to Congress that it has been well used.
- **Section 1206 *does not*:**
  - Create a slush fund for State and DoD operations that are unlikely to build *enduring* security capacity.
  - Provide resources for Iraq or Afghanistan, whose training and equipping are provided by separate appropriations.
  - Provide appropriated funds – 1206 funds are drawn from DoD O&M accounts.



# Special Operations and Combating Terrorism-New Thrusts



**“You Can’t Get to Where You Want to Be by Stayin’ Where You Are”**







# TSWG Mission and Objectives


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- **Mission:** Conduct the U.S. national interagency research and development program for Combating Terrorism.
- **Objectives:**
  - Provide interagency forum to coordinate R&D requirements for combating terrorism
  - Sponsor R&D for interagency advanced technology development
  - Promulgate technology information transfer
  - Influence basic and applied research



# TSWG Structure







# TSWG Membership



## **Department of Defense**

OASD(SO/LIC)  
OATSD(NCB)CP/CBD  
OUSD(A&T) DDR&E and S&TS/LW  
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology  
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  
Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
Joint IED Defeat Task Force  
National Security Agency  
Pentagon Force Protection Agency  
Polygraph Institute  
The Joint Staff  
Unified Commands  
US Special Operations Command  
US Air Force  
    Air Combat Command  
    Air Force Research Lab  
    Electronic Systems Center  
    AFOSI  
US Army  
    52<sup>nd</sup> ORD  
    SBCCOM / ECBC  
    Corps of Engineers / ERDC / PMDC  
    Criminal Investigations Command  
    Natick RDE Center  
    22<sup>nd</sup> Chemical Battalion (Tech Escort)  
    Training and Doctrine Command  
    National Guard Bureau  
US Navy  
    Naval Criminal Investigative Service  
    Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center  
    Naval Special Warfare  
    NEODTD / DTRG

US Marine Corps

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force  
Network Operations & Security Command

## **Department of State**

Bureau of Diplomatic Security  
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism  
Overseas Building Operations

## **Department of Agriculture**

Agricultural Research Service  
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service  
Food Safety and Inspection Service  
Office of the Inspector General

## **Department of Energy**

National Nuclear Security Administration  
Office of Energy Assurance  
Office of Security

## **Department of Health and Human Services/USPHS**

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention  
Food & Drug Administration  
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

## **Department of Homeland Security**

Border and Transportation Security  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
Office for Domestic Preparedness  
Emergency Preparedness & Response  
Transportation Security Agency  
Science and Technology  
US Coast Guard  
US Secret Service

## **Department of Commerce**

National Institute of Standards and Technology  
Office of Law Enforcement Standards

## **Department of Justice**

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives  
Drug Enforcement Administration  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Federal Bureau of Prisons  
National Institute of Justice  
Office of Justice Programs  
US Marshals Service

## **Department of Transportation**

Federal Aviation Administration  
Federal Railroad Administration  
Federal Transit Administration  
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration  
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

## **Department of the Treasury**

Federal Reserve Board


## **Independent Agencies**

Environmental Protection Agency  
General Services Administration  
Intelligence Community  
Interagency Board  
National Virtual Translation Center  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
State and Local Agencies  
Supreme Court of the United States  
US Capital Police  
US Postal Inspection Service  
US Senate Sergeant at Arms  
US Supreme Court Police





# International Partners

## *Bilateral Combating Terrorism R&D Agreements*



**United Kingdom**




**Israel**



**Singapore**



**Canada**



**Australia**



# Summary

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- **Forum to Rapidly Identify, Prioritize, Resolve, and Fund Needs/Requirements**
- **User Driven**
- **Interagency and International**
- **Support Transition to Acquisition and Commercial Production**
- **Fast Track and Flexible Program Forum**



If the Surge Fails • Obama's Plan to Win


# U.S. News & WORLD REPORT

FEBRUARY 19, 2007

EXCLUSIVE

## Terror's Next Target?

The scary truth  
about why  
America  
remains so  
vulnerable



\$4.50 U.S. / \$5.50 CANADA



www.usnews.com





# The Breath of the Beast

---

- “I recognized this arbitrary nature of terror immediately. I have seen its footprints in visits to Babi Yar and the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem. I watched it crash into the North Tower and slaughter Daniel Pearl on the internet. All of these events have their own unspeakable individual character but they all share the lunatic devaluation of human life that is born of a totalitarian belief system.” YB Moshe.





# Questions/Discussion



**MAJOR GENERAL BENOIT PUGA**

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDER, FRANCE**

***Waging  
the long War  
on Terrorism***

**18th NDIA SO/LIC SYMPOSIUM, WASHINGTON – FEBRUARY 2007**





**Undetectable enemy**

**Using conventional and non conventional means**

**Combining classical and non classical actions**

**Fire power, advanced technology  
and traditional courses of actions  
are no longer sufficient.**

**An enemy that often has the initiative**






**Interoperability**  
**Industrial reactivity**  
**Capacity to adapt**



The background of the slide is a composite image. The top left shows a military jet in flight, leaving a large plume of smoke. The top right shows soldiers in a trench, illuminated by a bright light source. The bottom right shows two soldiers in a field, one holding a rifle. The central text is overlaid on a dark blue rectangular box with a thin purple border.

**Unpredictable and  
unstable  
environment**





**The political  
success is now  
reached  
during the  
consolidation phase**





# New data to be considered

- Interoperability
- security concern
- force protection
- population a major stake
- monitor local security forces
- win the peace
- destabilize the enemy
- confidentiality







The background of the slide is a composite image. The top left shows a fighter jet in flight, leaving a large plume of smoke. The top right shows soldiers in a trench at night, illuminated by a bright light source. The bottom right shows two soldiers in camouflage gear and hats, crouching in a field during the day.

**Thinking war and  
the way to do it  
differently**





**Special Forces  
trained and  
equipped to do  
otherwise**





SF

Conventional  
forces

High  
value targets

To secure the  
operational area





- High sensitive targets
- seeking for more interoperability
- mastering capabilities / adapted technology
- intelligence / man in the loop / reliable sensors
- capability to upgrade both procedures and equipment as quickly as possible
- special human intell assets
- sharing information





# Conclusion





# “The View from the Joint Staff”



Lieutenant General John F. Sattler  
Director for Strategic Plans & Policy  
The Joint<sup>1</sup> Staff



## *Purpose*

- Brief primer on National and Military GWOT Strategies
- Why Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) is important
- 1206 and 1208 authorities, a success story
- BPC Efforts





# THE THREAT





# National Strategy for the GWOT



## Ends

### Strategic Aims:

- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and
- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them

Protect and defend the Homeland

Attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad

Support mainstream Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism

## Ways

Expand foreign partnerships and partnership capacity

Strengthen our capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of WMD

Institutionalize, domestically and internationally, the strategy against violent extremists

## Means

All Instruments of National Power



# Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT

**Ends**

***Strategic Goal:*** Preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on the rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to our way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.

*Leadership*

*Safe Havens*

**Enemy**

*Finance*

*Communication*

*Movement*

*Intelligence*

*Weapons*

*Personnel*

*Ideology*

**Protect the  
Homeland**

**Disrupt and Attack  
Terrorist Networks**

**Counter Ideological  
Support for Terrorism**

***Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.***

***Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.***

***Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt.***

***Defeat terrorists and their organizations.***

***Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.***

***Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.***

**Military Strategic Objectives**

**Ways**


**Means**

**Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies**



# *KOREAN PENINSULA AT NIGHT*

Nighttime Lights, Korean Peninsula  
21 September 2003, 1201z





## *FY 06 Section 1206*

- **POTUS authority to direct SECDEF to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces to:**
  - Conduct counterterrorist operations *or*
  - Participate in or support military and stability operations in which US Armed Forces are a participant
- **Limited to \$200M/year from Defense-wide O&M**
- **Would have expired 30 Sep 07**

Combatant Commanders consistently rank 1206 as one of their highest priorities in conducting operations in their AORs.





## *FY 07 Section 1206*

- **Increases authority to \$300M/year**
- **Gives SECDEF approval authority with concurrence of SECSTATE**
- **Extends authority through FY08**
- **Removes the “Defense-wide” O&M restriction**



## *Section 1206 Process*

1. **Combatant Command/ Chief of Mission** initiate request; complete proposal template
2. **Coordinate with DOD/DOS** counterpart
3. **Submit through chain-of-command**
4. **JS/DOD/DOS** review proposals and prioritize
5. **DSCA** will assess executability and verify cost estimates; **OSD Comptroller** begin to identify funding
6. **Obtain SecDef/SecState** approval
7. **Submit to President**
8. **Notify Congress within 15 days of execution**

# Section 1208: Special Ops Train & Equip Authority



- **FY05 Nat'l Defense Authorization Act, Section 1208:**
  - Allows SecDef to provide support to foreign forces, **irregular forces, groups or individuals** engaged in supporting ongoing CT ops by US special ops forces
  - Limited to \$25M annually (USSOCOM-executed)
  - Expires 30 Sep 07
- **Process:**
  - SecDef and SecState approve EXORDS
  - Prior to exercising authority:
    - SecDef coordinates with SecState
    - SecDef notifies Congress
  - SecDef annually reports recipients and amounts
- **Way Ahead: Seeking Congressional support to make authority permanent**



# *Building Global Partnerships Act*

- DoD is routinely and legitimately called upon to perform certain activities for which DoD lacks proper authorities
- Prepared a bill, *The Building Global Partnerships Act*
  - Improves our ability to get many of these things done
  - COCOMs suggested many elements
  - Still in coordination with State
- The effort will not succeed without a concerted effort by senior defense leaders and our State counterparts

***Key to prosecution of the war on terrorism***





## *The National Security Initiative Fund*

- **Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is underinvested in preventative strategies that build the capacity of foreign partners**
- **An interagency national security account, administered by DoD and DoS**
  - **dedicated to whole-of-government solutions**
- **Still in coordination with State**



# *DOS Civilian Reserve Corps*

- **DOS expeditionary capabilities currently fall far short**
- **DOS recently proposed creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps**
  - **Would address some shortfalls ( $\approx$ \$25M) while a program ( $\approx$ \$1B/year) is developed**
- **POTUS addressed in State of the Union**
- **DOD can greatly assist DOS in advocating for this proposal to Congress**

***Key to executing both post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and preventative strategies***



# *“Goldwater-Nichols” for the Interagency*

- **Focus on reforming our National Security System**
  - **Organization, roles, and missions of the interagency**
  - **’07 NDAA tasks POTUS and SecDef with interagency studies**

*US Government exploring the best approach to develop a national security reform agenda*



# QUESTIONS?





# BACKUP



# *Building Capacity: Takes Time – South Korea*

## **In 1953 – at the end of the Korean War,**

- Was devastated by Japanese occupation and the war with the north
- Natural, human, and manmade resources were destroyed
- Had a 95% illiteracy rate and no record of national governance
- Gross Domestic Product was equivalent to the poorest Asian and African Countries

## **In 2007 – 54 years later,**

- Is known as one of the “Asian Tigers” – one of the top four Asian economies
- GDP has grown to match those within the European Union
- A stable and legitimate democratic government with a free market economy
- No longer requires large amounts of American support for survival
- US forces still present

## **Other Long Term Examples of Success,**

- Germany, Japan

**“For ... the global community, the withering away of the state is not a prelude to utopia but to disaster ... These weak states have posed threats to international order because they are the source of conflict and ... because they have become the potential breeding grounds for a new kind of terrorism that can reach into the developed world.”**

**Francis Fukuyama, State Building, Cornell University Press, 2004.**



# *Building Capacity in the Cold War*

- **Long Term Examples of Success (Decades of Support)**
  - Germany, Japan, South Korea
- **Commonalities**
  - Sustained American Presence – still today (over 50 years)
  - Significant American Investment
  - Democratic societies with free market economies
- **Payoff**
  - Partner nations stood up to Communist threats
  - All are significant allies and trading partners
  - Each is a stabilizing force within their region

***Key Lesson: Capacity building takes decades...but it is what allows the United States to win this war in the long term.***




# *What 1206 Does and Does Not Do*

- Section 1206 *does*:
  - Give DoD a 2-year \$200M (per year) train and equip authority.
  - Require DoD to formulate programs and coordinate implementation with State.
  - Allow DoD to build the capacity of a foreign country's military forces to conduct time-sensitive:
    - A. Counterterrorism or
    - B. Stability operations in which US forces are a participant.
  - Require a Presidential review of the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act, due at the end of FY06 (SEP 06).
  - Expire on 30 September 2007 – although it could be renewed and even expanded if the Executive Branch demonstrates to Congress that it has been well used.
- Section 1206 *does not*:
  - Create a fund for State and DoD operations that are unlikely to build *enduring* security capacity.
  - Provide resources for Iraq or Afghanistan, whose training and equipping are provided by separate appropriations.
  - Avoid existing Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Control Act prohibitions on this type of assistance.
  - Provide appropriated funds: 1206 funds are drawn from “defense-wide operation and maintenance” – a narrow slice of overall operation and maintenance funds.
  - Allow DoD to build the capacity of a foreign country's non-military security forces.



# *Building Global Partnerships Act*



## Capability

TRAINING  
EQUIPPING  
EXERCISING  
ADVISING

## Capacity

LOGISTIC &  
MATERIEL  
SUPPORT  
TECHNICAL  
SUPPORT

## Compatibility

INTER-  
OPERABILITY  
COMMON  
LEARNING  
INFORMATION &  
INTEL SHARING

## Conditions

SUPPORTING  
LOCAL  
POPULATIONS

***Four Lines of Approach – 16 New Authorities***





## *FY 06 Section 1206*

- **FY 06 Section 1206 gave the President authority to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to**
  - Conduct counterterrorist operations *or*
  - Participate in or support military and stability operations in which US Armed Forces are a participant

**Combatant Commanders consistently rank 1206 as one of their highest priorities in conducting operations in their AORs.**



## *FY 06 Section 1206*

- **Section 1206 was limited to \$200 million per year from Defense-wide O&M; no corresponding appropriation**
  - Required:
    - Presidential approval
    - SecState/SecDef concurrence
- **Would expire 30 Sep 07**

***Combatant Commands and State prepared proposals for implementation under the authority in FY06***



## Section 1206

- **1206 does**
  - Provide an option for Combatant Commands to execute time-sensitive efforts in Building Partner Capacity.
- **1206 does not:**
  - Provide resources for Iraq/Afghanistan. This is done under separate appropriation.

# Technologies from the National Labs to Wage the Long War

**Russell D Skocypec, PhD**

**Deputy Director**

**Human, Systems and Simulation Technologies**

**Sandia National Labs**

**[rdskocy@sandia.gov](mailto:rdskocy@sandia.gov)**

**(505) 845-8838**

**February 26, 2007**

**National Laboratories Panel**


**18<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium and Exhibition**

**“Warfare in the Seams: Defense and Industry Partnering to Win the Long War”**



# Characteristics of the threat


- Emerging from societies and people who remain disconnected physically but who share a common philosophy
- Philosophy enabled by ability to communicate
- Locus of violence has shifted to the individual actor
- Nuanced threat – vague, inconsistent, irrational, difficult to measure, not well understood
- Threats can adapt and evolve faster than we are transforming



**Impacts ALL national security agencies/departments  
DoD, IC, DHS, ... and DOE!**



# Sandia is evolving to meet these challenges




***Creating unique national security systems solutions based on solid science for the Long War***

# Key competencies to meet our mission challenges



**Modeling & Simulation**



**Design & Analysis**



**Fabrication**




**Environmental Testing**




**Sensing**

**8,500+ employees  
1,500+ PhDs; 2,500+ MS  
~\$2.3B operating budget**

## **Foundational S&T:**



**Materials**




**Computing, Information**



**Engineering**



**Pulsed Power**



**Microelectronics, Photonics**



**Cognition**




**Test & Evaluation**

***Often partnering with DoD and industry***



# A DOE Labs team (FIST) has been part of the FCS program for over 6 years




Govt Tech Resource Analysis Team

Architecture

Combat ID

Network Vulnerability



System of Systems Engineering and Integration

Adv Decision Support System

Log & Supportability

Countermine

Critical Technology Evaluations

M&S for SoS

MOUT Analytics, Mobile Network/Comms, UAVs, Humans

Future Spiral-In Concepts, Sensor Dart, EM Gun Tech Seedlings

***Providing objective technical advice  
using complementary DOE capabilities***






# Sandia is partnering with industry to help address system sustainment & readiness challenges

## System-of-Systems



## RECAP/RESET




APACHE LONGBOW

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)



## Enterprise & PBL



## Manpower & Readiness

F/A-18 Propulsion Readiness



LCAC Readiness



CVN 21 CVW Manpower



# A DOE Labs team is supporting the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)

## Anticipating the Threat

- Continued emphasis on the network, adaptivity, systems solutions

## Innovating Solutions



- Embedded staff at JIEDDO
- Reachback to our experts
- Technology contributions
- Systems assessment & recommendations

## Creating Value


- NNSA/DOE lab team; industry partners

## Informing the Debate

- Defense Science Board C-IED Task Force
- National Academy of Sciences Committee
- JIEDDO S&T Plan



Environmental Conditions



Ability of sensor modality to detect threat with sufficiently low false alarms

***Leveraging complementary capabilities at DOE***




# Sandia-led team developed non-kinetic training for Special Forces JFK Special Warfare Center and School




## Adaptive Thinking and Leadership

Game-based training to augment warfighter situation awareness and negotiation skills through culturally relevant scenarios for future special forces officers and NCO's



# The S&T base for the Long War must enable us to discern meaning from great complexity

- **Model processes**
- **Identify potential signatures or create new observables**
- **Develop sensor systems to measure the observables**
- **Fuse data to identify patterns of activities**



*We must focus on understanding why (vs only what)*

# Summary

- **The Long War cuts across ALL national security agencies/departments**
- **Sandia is evolving to meet these challenges**
- **The DOE Labs are actively engaged with the services to meet requirements, often partnering with industry**
- **The challenges of the Long War are so great that it is in the national interest to work together**



# 18<sup>th</sup> Annual SO/LIC Symposium

## “Warfare in the Seams: Defense and Industry Partnering in the Long War”



Presented by

**George W. Solhan**

Deputy Chief of Naval Research for  
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and  
Combating Terrorism S&T Department (ONR 30)

**26 February 2007**




# Naval Research: A Statutory Mission

## Naval Research Laboratory (Appropriations Act, 1916):

*“[Conduct] exploratory and research work...necessary... for the benefit of Government service, including the construction, equipment, and operation of a laboratory....”*

## Office of Naval Research (Public Law 588, 1946):

*“... plan, foster, and encourage scientific research in recognition of its paramount importance as related to the maintenance of future naval power, and the reservation of national security.... ”*



## Transitioning S&T (Defense Authorization Act, 2001):


*“...manage the Navy’s basic, applied, and advanced research to **foster transition** from science and technology to higher levels of research, development, test, and evaluation.”*



# Office of Naval Research (ONR) Science and Technology Program

- \$2.2 billion budget (of which \$600-800M are pre-assigned congressional plus-ups)
- ONR has three primary investment thrusts:
  - **Discovery and Invention** (Basic and applied research) (6.1 & 6.2)
  - **Future Naval Capabilities** (Advanced Technology Demonstrations that are near term programs close to transition to an acquisition program of record) (6.2 & 6.3)
  - **Innovative Naval Prototypes** (high risk, high profile programs that potentially would be ready to transition in 4-8 years) (6.2 & 6.3)

# ONR 30 Mission: Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and Combating Terrorism



## Office of Naval Research (Public Law 588, 1946):

“... **plan, foster, and encourage scientific research** in recognition of its paramount importance as related to the maintenance of **future naval power**, and the **preservation of national security**....”

## Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and Combating Terrorism (Code 30)

To lead the Department of the Navy's Science and Technology efforts that develop future **combat capabilities for Naval Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and the Department's role in Combating Terrorism**:

...the exploitation and subsequent application of Science and Technology in order to enhance the ability of the **Navy-Marine Corps team to achieve assured access and conduct decisive operations as the naval portion of a joint campaign.**



### Investment Thrust Areas:

C4  
Fires  
Force Protection  
Human Performance  
Operational Adaptation

Logistics  
Maneuver  
Mine Countermeasures  
Maritime Irregular Warfare



# Background

- ❑ **11 Sep 2001: US engaged in Global War on Terror**
- ❑ **Sep 2005: ONR Code 30 created, and assigned CbT mission**
  - *Initiated an Executive Leadership Team (ELT) (Department Heads and Directors) and Working Group (Deputies) to review, analyze, and develop recommendations for a coordinated and integrated ONR-wide CbT S&T program*
  - *Conducted coordination meetings with DHS, NECC, USCG, and USMC Distributed Operations representatives to develop appropriate reliance, relevance and ultimately transition*
- ❑ **April 2006: ONR CbT Taxonomy approved and CbT portfolio analysis completed**
- ❑ **August 2006: Began development of a coordinated and integrated ONR CbT S&T investment strategy**

# National & Naval GWOT Strategy/Analysis

## Strategic Guidance



National Security Strategy (2002)

### Key Goals

- Strengthen Alliances to **Defeat** Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends
- Work with others to **Defuse** Regional Conflicts
- **Prevent** Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction
- **Transform** America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century

National Defense Strategy (2005)



National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003)



National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005)



National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002)



## *Naval Guidance*

NSP

NOC

USMC OpCon

## *Other Guidance*

QDR

FM 3-24  
COIN

## *External Coordination*



## ONR CbT Capability Areas

*Global Maritime Domain Awareness*

*Operational Adaptation*

*Maritime Irregular Warfare*



# **CbT Capability Areas & Enabling Capabilities**

## **Global Maritime Domain Awareness**

- ☐ *All Source Collection*
- ☐ *Intelligence & Information Analysis & Fusion*
- ☐ *Netcentric Dissemination*
- ☐ *Persistent, Pervasive, Affordable Surveillance*
- ☐ *Tag, Track, and Locate*

## **Maritime Irregular Warfare**

- ☐ *Ship Disabling Non-Lethal Systems*
- ☐ *Enhanced Maritime Interception Operations*
- ☐ *Expeditionary Security*
- ☐ *Biometrics*
- ☐ *Real-time Forensic Site Exploitation*
- ☐ *Logistics for Distributed Forces*
- ☐ *Extended Small-unit ISR*
- ☐ *Extended Small-unit Engagement*
- ☐ *Enhanced Individual and Small-unit Mobility*
- ☐ *CBRN Defense*
- ☐ *Tactical Comm in Complex Environments*

## **Operational Adaptation**

- ☐ *Warfighting Decision Superiority*
- ☐ *Commander's Preparation of the Environment*
- ☐ *Information Operations and Related Capabilities*
- ☐ *Battlespace Shaping*
- ☐ *Operational Culture Understanding & Communication*
- ☐ *Mission Gaming and Rehearsal*
- ☐ *Adaptive Thinking and Leader Development*

## **Counter IED**

- ☐ *IED Prediction*
- ☐ *IED Prevention*
- ☐ *IED and Mine Detection*
- ☐ *IED and Mine Neutralization*
- ☐ *IED and Mine Effects Mitigation*
- ☐ *Technical and Forensic Exploitation*

# Asymmetric and Irregular Warfare (Combating Terrorism)

**Vision:** Enable Naval forces to preempt and defeat adaptive non-conventional threats operating within complex physical and social terrain.

## Objectives

### ISR:

- **Unmanned Vehicles:** Intelligent autonomous unmanned vehicles, sensors, and communications
- **Interior/Exterior Imaging:** Rapidly reconstruct and fuse multi-aspect sensor data into 3-D tactical models of building interiors and exteriors
- **Riverine Surveillance:** Common and persistent maritime picture on and below the surface/shore

### Intelligence Analysis:



- Image and Pattern recognition tools
- Societal, cultural, and behavioral modeling
- Biometrics

### Active and Passive Forensics Tools:

- Field-portable forensic tools, sensors, and sensor networks; as well as spectrally-coded particulate markers and probes

### Advanced Countermeasures:

- Dominate EM spectrum
- Predict, detect and neutralize IED's and P-IED's
- Deny adversaries the ability to hide among civilian population
- Phase 0 S&T



## Key Research Topics

Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Technologies  
 Unmanned Air and Ground Vehicles  
 Intelligent and Autonomous Systems  
 Automated Image Understanding  
 Information Processing & Presentation  
 Social, Cultural & Behavioral Modeling  
 Biometrics  
 Nanoscale Electronic Devices and Sensors  
 EW Attack  
 Counter IED  
 Non-Lethal weapons

## **Irregular Warfare--Defined**

**“Irregular warfare is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. *Irregular warfare factors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.*” (Irregular Warfare Roadmap - QDR)**

**Detecting and Effecting anonymous irregular threats dispersed throughout the human landscape...*“irregular”***

***versus***

**Finding and Destroying distinctive conventional formations concentrated on the physical landscape...*“traditional”***

# Traditional Warfare vs. Irregular Warfare

	<b><i>Traditional Warfare</i></b>	<b><i>Irregular Warfare</i></b>
1	The center of gravity is often the adversary's <b><i>military forces and political leadership</i></b>	The center of gravity is usually the <b><i>indigenous population</i></b>
2	Influencing the <b><i>physical terrain</i></b> is key.	Influencing the <b><i>social &amp; cultural terrain</i></b> is key
3	Conducted by <b><i>regular forces</i></b> of <b><i>nation states</i></b> that are <b><i>separate and distinct</i></b> from the civilian population	Often conducted by <b><i>irregular forces</i></b> of <b><i>state or non-state networks</i></b> that are <b><i>embedded</i></b> (not distinct) from the civilian population
4	<b><i>Focused kinetic effects -- Physical</i></b>	<b><i>Distributed non-kinetic effects -- Psychological</i></b>
5	<b>Symmetrical</b> – less opportunity to adapt forces and material	<b>Asymmetrical</b> – more opportunity to adapt forces and material
6	Focus on the <b>kinetic destruction</b> of the adversaries warfighting material from <b><i>stand-off</i></b> distances	Focus on the <b><i>non-kinetic influence</i></b> of local and regional populations requiring <b><i>face-to-face</i></b> interaction.
7	<b><i>Tactical competence</i></b> is critical	<b><i>Cultural and tactical competence</i></b> is critical
8	Threat forces and relationships <b><i>easily templated</i></b>	Threat forces and relationships <b><i>difficult to template</i></b>
9	<b><i>d i M e</i></b> ( <i>Diplomatic, Information, Military, &amp; Economic with emphasis on the Military</i> )	<b><i>D I m E</i></b> – <i>High interagency (Emphasis on Diplomatic, Information, and Economic)</i>
10	<b><i>Metrics of success are easily defined</i></b>	<b><i>Metrics of success are not easily defined</i></b>
11	Proven technological advantage	Advanced technology advantage remains unproven as benefactor to irregular warfare

# Operational Adaptation (OA): *“The Information Warfare Game Changer”*



# Operational Adaptation


**Definition:** (OA) The development and sustainment of a tempo of operations and a rhythm of adaptation and decision superiority that is beyond an adversary's ability.

\*\*\*\*\*

## **Previous Studies Have Pointed Toward The Need For “Operational Adaptation”**


- June 2001 **Institute for Defense Analysis** study:  
**“New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations”**
- Key attributes of Effects Based Operations:
  - Focus on decision superiority (not just precision engagement or targeting)
  - Applicable in peace and war
  - Look beyond the direct, immediate first-order effects
  - Adaptation at the operational level occurs in a disciplined process
  - Include all elements of national power (economic, political, etc)
- **Game Changer**
  - “Victory is gained through a tempo or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond the other side’s ability to achieve or sustain.” FM 3-24

# Current Situation...The Adaptation Dance



# Objective Effects of Operational Adaptation...

**Forewarning Objectives:**  
Tactical – Hours  
Operational – Days  
Strategic – Weeks



# The OODA Loop (Boyd Cycle) (The Key to Solving Operational Adaptation)

The Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop provides a standard description of decision making cycles that is widely understood and accepted throughout the U.S. military. It was developed by Colonel John (Richard) Boyd (January 23, 1927–March 9, 1997) who was a United States Air Force fighter pilot and military strategist of the late 20th century whose theories have been highly influential in the military and in business.




## Four Activity Components

1. **Observe** – *collect, store, and access raw (but relevant) data and information related to one's environment, situation, objective, opposition, etc. This activity includes observation of the effects of one's own actions or inactions.*
2. **Orient** – *analyze the results of one's observation activities in order to achieve understanding of the situation or in order to uncover gaps in one's observations.*
3. **Decide** – *incorporate one's understanding of the situation to develop appropriate courses of action (COAs), analyze competing COAs, predict 2<sup>nd</sup>- and 3<sup>rd</sup>-order effects, and select the combination of actions (and inactions) that will achieve the most favorable effect(s). This activity may uncover additional gaps in one's observation and orientation activities.*
4. **Act** – *execute the actions selected during the previous activity.*




# The OODA Loop (Boyd Cycle)


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
## *Dominated*




## *Reactive*



## *Proactive*




## *Domination of all domains*



# Proposed S&T Plan: *Road to Operational Adaptation*

## Technology Effectiveness Spectrum





- 5 Demos
- 3 Phases
- Demos build upon each other

# Demo 1 – Phase 2: Affordable Persistent Pervasive Surveillance

(Wide Areas up to 200 nm<sup>2</sup> - Open Ocean, Littoral, Rivers & Urban)


100% of Program Objective



Maritime

Riverine


Urban/ Asymmetric



Urban and  
Terrain Imaging

GPS

GIS Geodata



## Methodology:

- Stealthy, long range, and high endurance UAVs for “eyes in the sky” - deployable from ocean and remote locations
- Inexpensive, low power consumption surveillance payloads
- Panoramic, wide-aperture optical sensors with 3-D imaging
- Data processing for minimization of transmitted data using physical indicators and anomalies
- Low bandwidth, over the horizon datalinks

## Demo 2: Near Real-Time Forensics and Social Network Mapping

(Attack forensics and potential forewarning of seconds prior to attack)

Global Intel Sources



Timeline



Attack Occurs

Attack Analyzed Using Database Info

Methodology:

- All-source intelligence fusion;
- social network mapping; persistent, pervasive surveillance; multi-spectral collection and analysis; and automated tracking of entities

Surveillance & Global Intelligence Info Databased





- Analysis Algorithms Define Network(s) in Near Real-Time Using Surveillance, Intel & Attack Info
- Enemy Network Rapidly Identified



# Information Operations Evolution (Demo 5)


Information Operations are the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.





# Distributed Operations (DO)

***“Maneuver Warfare is the shift from quantitative characteristics of warfare – mass and volume – to qualitative factors of speed, stealth, precision, and sustainability”***



***“Distributed Operations constitutes a form of Maneuver Warfare. The essence of this concept lies in the capacity for coordinated action by highly capable units, dispersed throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace, ordered and connected within an operational design focused on a common aim.”***

# Distributed Operations

**Vision:** Enable dispersed small units to dominate extended battlespace through advanced warfighter training, unambiguous situational awareness, robust communications and sense and respond logistics.

## Objectives

### Training

- Enhancement of Physical and Cognitive Performance
- Simulation – based scenarios for enhanced training
- Rapid assimilation of cultural environments

### Communications

- Robust Command and Control networks
- Airborne relays on manned and unmanned platforms

### Logistics

- Rapid re-supply and medical evacuation whenever possible
- Real-time automatic supply sensors and network
- Optimize medical self-sufficiency

### Fires

- Integrate firepower of distributed ground, offshore, and air assets
- Blue Force Tracking down to the individual

### Survivability

- Warfighter stealth technology
- Warfighter exoskeleton technology

### Maneuver

- Adaptable and survivable tactical mobility systems to enhance operational tempo and extend range of vehicles and soldiers
- Advanced materials to reduce combat load



## Key Research Topics

Training, Education & Human Performance  
Expeditionary C4  
Communications and Networks  
Expeditionary Logistics  
Expeditionary Firepower  
Precision Strike  
Expeditionary ISR  
Unmanned Air and Ground Vehicles  
Special Warfare / EOD  
Land Mine Countermeasures  
Expeditionary Maneuver/ Individual Mobility

# Decreasing the Marine's Load

## Yesterday's & Today's Marine – Overloaded!

1960s



Today



No Change

Treat the Marine as a system – Focus on the entire individual

*~Make smart tradeoffs between performance & weight~*

Improvements in:



- Combat Load
- Ergonomics
- Nutrition
- Physiologic Performance (Endurance, Strength)
- Fatigue Management
- Protection

## Tomorrow's Marine: Optimized for Combat Endurance

Equals improvements in a Marine's load-bearing capability



# Human Performance, Training & Education (HPT&E) 6.2 Investment



## OBJECTIVE:

- Optimize individual & team performance using a range of solutions, scaleable across all leadership levels & echelons in complex combat environments (e.g., DO).
- Provide fundamental KSAs for a complete Warfighter in any combat situation via methods that generate & maintain combat effectiveness (e.g., basic skills acquisition, consolidation in scenario-based training, situation-targeted education)
- Continual assessment and diagnosis of individual and team capabilities and potentials
- Develop physically realistic models for combat performance simulation & evaluation
- Delineate neural mechanisms differentiating transition of learner from novice to expert

## TECHNICAL APPROACH:

- Operational metric assessment, ID baseline performance level, scenario design & validation study
- Develop foundational learning theories extended to complex tasks for a range of expertise levels, training mitigation strategies triggered by neurophysiological markers of learning, cognition & expertise, & principles of expertise development on a continuum of novice to expert
- Develop training mitigation strategies triggered by behavioral and neurophysiological markers of learning, cognition and expertise
- Design and develop principles of expertise development on a continuum of novice to expert learning framework for both individual and team training
- Build task-specific models of expertise development in dismounted and mounted task environments; Develop simulation based automated diagnostic assessment of Knowledge, Skills, Abilities & Potentials (KSA&Ps) to drive HPT&E systems

## PAYOFF:

- Enhanced combat capabilities at individual and small unit level
- Significant increases in training efficiency, completion, and effectiveness rates per unit time for individuals and small unit leaders in both real and virtual/augmented environments
- Enhanced training via tailored and real-time closed-loop training systems that are based on neuro-cognitive and psychologically-driven instructional strategies developed
- Ensure a small, yet potent fighting force by realizing the full potential of each Marine via efficient, targeted assessment and selection methods
- Enhanced team cognition and combat effectiveness capability
- Enhanced Warfighter capability to effectively/efficiently Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act during complex, stressful combat conditions
- Support USMC S&T Master Plan and STOs

# The Ultimate Customer – The Warfighter!

**Caveat: Real Customer: SYSCOMs, PEOs, DRPMs**

## **HOT Buttons:**

1. Survivability
2. Reduce Combat Load
3. Small Unit Excellence
4. Fuel Efficiency
5. Light weight portable power sources
6. “Transparent” Urban Structures
7. Modular, Scaleable Weapons
8. CIED, MCM, CRAM
9. Operational Adaptation
10. Infantry combat load reduction





# *QUESTIONS?*





# **Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP)**

**Purpose: Provide an Operational Overview**

**COL Kenneth Tovo**

**27 February 2007**


The overall classification is:  
**Unclassified**



# Agenda

- **Who We Are (1 slide)**
- **Photos (3 slides)**
- **CJSOTF-AP Operational Reach (1 slide)**
- **Foreign Internal Defense (1 slide)**
- **Operational Vignette (4 slides)**
- **Non-Kinetic Vignette (2 slides)**
- **Summary (1 slide)**

# Who We Are







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# Goal: Self-Reliant and Self-Sustaining



UNCLASSIFIED





UNCLASSIFIED

# Strength: Tactical Confidence



UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

# Focus: Inculcating Values –


Nation over Self, Tribe, or Religious Interests



UNCLASSIFIED

# CJSOTF-AP Operational Reach

UNCLASSIFIED



## -CJSOTF-AP Trains, Advises, and Assists:

- 39 Iraqi Army Battalions
- 13 Iraqi Police Units
- 99% of operations are by, with, & through Iraqis



-CJSOTF-AP Engages local residents, tribes, city and provincial government officials to gain influence

-CJSOTF-AP Leverages PAO, CMO and PSYOP for non-kinetic targeting/influencing.


UNCLASSIFIED





# How the CJSOTF Fights

## *Foreign Internal Defense in combat*




# Operational Vignette








# Operational Vignette





# Operational Vignette






# Operational Vignette






# Non-Kinetic Vignette







# Non-Kinetic Vignette







# Summary

**CJSOTF-AP's role in Iraq is three-fold:**

- Develop ISF capability to conduct COIN**
- Neutralize insurgent capability through intelligence-driven, precision operations**
- Employ non-kinetic enablers to achieve desired and lasting effects**

# TASK FORCE LEGION






# Back-up Slides




# CJSOTF-AP “EKG” Model

Effective Targeting Through Time




# Targeting Vignette







# CJSOTF-AP Operations to disrupt Extra-Judicial Killings (EJK)





# Operational Vignette





# Operational Vignette







# Operational Vignette





# Operational Vignette







# Operational Vignette















**DETAINED**



# Warfare in the Seams

## Industry Vignettes

18th Annual SO/LIC Symposium and Exhibition  
February 27, 2007





## Overview

### One man's take on War in the Seams:

**Sun Tzu** circa 400 BC

"So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak."



"If the enemy is superior in strength, evade him. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared; appear where you are not expected."



## Know Your Enemy

“We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you.”

-Hussein Massawi  
Former Hezbollah leader




In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia provided the state with a monopoly on the use of organized violence

Such is no longer the case



## Forces Behind Iraq Instability





## Defense and Industry Partnering to Win

**GEN. PETRAEUS:** You then should add in tens of thousands of additional forces that are over there; that provide, of all things, contract security for our embassy... and that frees up uniformed forces to perform other missions.

**SEN. PRYOR:** Just for the sake of clarity, when you talk about a counterinsurgent, are you talking about anybody that's on our side? I mean, it could be the Iraqi police, obviously, the Iraqi army, obviously, other Iraqi security forces.

**GEN. PETRAEUS:** That's correct. Yes, sir.

**SEN. PRYOR:** But it could also be contractors?

**GEN. PETRAEUS:** If they're performing security functions, yes, sir.





## Types of Asymmetric Threats

- Terrorism
- Technology
- Deception
- Disinformation
- Misinformation
- Time
- Guerilla Warfare
- Will
- Training
- Tactics
- Terrain
- Values



Secure Success.

## Baghdad IZ Checkpoint







*Secure Success.*

## Baghdad IZ Checkpoint (Cont)







Secure Success.

## Office in Basrah







*Secure Success.*

## Basrah Checkpoint







## Basrah Checkpoint (Cont)





## Iraq Concept of Shame and Honor

### Shame and Honor

- Govern individual, group relationships and competition. Honor is defined differently in Iraq.
- Honor is exchanged like currency but is not for sale; most valued of resources eclipsing money, jobs and influence.
- Zero-sum exchange: Honor is gained at another's loss of honor and imposition of shame. When one is shamed, he is compelled to act to regain his honor.

### Application

- Behaving as an honorable guest will often protect us and our clients, just as becoming known as shameful will often increase odds of attack.
- Important to apply cultural knowledge of shame and honor into all aspects of operational planning, assuring that our clients are respected, and thus protected, whenever possible.



## Iraq Culture

### Diverse Traditions


- Iraq behavior is dictated by complex rules combining 3,000 year-old tribal tradition, Sharia (Islamic Law), pre-Saddam civil law, and post-Saddam civil law. Knowing which group adheres to which laws is critical in navigating throughout the country.

### Relationships

- *A/ways* a direct relationship between a large company, a dominant tribe, a politician, an influential cleric and a paramilitary force.
- Though the current strife between Shiites and Sunnis is very real, it does not follow that they have always been at war or always will be. Many tribes have both Shia and Suni members and many continue to inter-marry, though admittedly very quietly these days.



## Conclusion



# Stand-off Nuclear Radiation Detection

---

*Peter E. Vanier*

*Detector Development and Testing Div.  
Nonproliferation and National Security Dept.  
Brookhaven National Laboratory*

*Presented at the  
18<sup>th</sup> Annual NDIA  
Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict  
Symposium and Exhibition  
Hyatt Crystal City  
February 26 –28, 2007*



# BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY SITE








# Camp Upton



- **Established in 1947 on Long Island, Upton, New York, Brookhaven is a multi-program national laboratory operated by Brookhaven Science Associates for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).**
- **Six Nobel Prizes have been awarded for discoveries made at the Lab.**
- **Brookhaven has a staff of approximately 3,000 scientists, engineers, technicians and support staff and over 4,000 guest researchers annually.**
- **Brookhaven National Laboratory's role for the DOE is to produce excellent science and advanced technology with the cooperation, support, and appropriate involvement of our scientific and local communities.**






Collision of gold nuclei at RHIC

# Lab work with Industry: Radiation Portal Monitor Testing and Evaluation






# Lab work with Industry: Cadmium Zinc Telluride material evaluation




# Correlations between x-ray map & IR image

This x-ray map shows the degraded regions precisely correspond to Te precipitates on the right



This IR image shows Te precipitates, which could be identified by shape with IR microscope




100% correlations were found for all CZT samples tested in this work.

# Lab Work with Industry – Compressed Xenon Spectrometers


- Operate at room temperature
- Sufficient resolution to identify isotopes
- Scalable to large volumes - increased sensitivity
- Identify special nuclear materials
- Allow passage of medical isotopes
- Allow naturally occurring radioactive materials
- Reduce false positive rate



planar design




CTC coaxial design



Pu-239 spectrum using xenon




# High-speed, radiation-tolerant sampling/digitizing board




240-channel multichip module for Si drift detector readout


## Gamma Imaging



Positron emission tomograph for imaging the awake animal brain



# Low-power ASICs




Preamplifier/shaper ASIC block diagram

Microelectronics Group
AREAS OF EXPERTISE


- CMOS monolithic circuits
- charge-sensitive sensor interface
- analog signal processing
- low noise, low power techniques
- VLSI custom design + layout

## National Security

Handheld imaging probe for gamma radiation



Radiation sensitive pixel readout




Gamma spectrometer for detection of nuclear materials



# Technology investment by BNL that can be helpful in solving SOLIC challenges


- Assume that terrorists will use any means to get attention, including radioactive materials
- Develop of new radiation detectors
  - Gamma spectrometers
  - **Neutron imagers**
- Improve interdiction of radioactive materials traffic
  - Force protection from Radiation Dispersal Devices
  - Force protection from Improvised Nuclear Devices

# Interrogation of containers and trucks




# Directional Detection and Imaging


- Pinhole camera
- Poor sensitivity



**FISSION SOURCE**




# Thermal Neutron Imager



4. Cadmium-lined coded aperture camera




# Reconstructing the image from the shadowgram



$$R(k,l) = \sum_{i=1}^r \sum_{j=1}^r N(i,j)G(k+i,l+j)$$

# Reconstructing the image from the shadowgram

(-1)



(+1)


$$R(k,l) = \sum_{i=1}^r \sum_{j=1}^r N(i,j)G(k+i,l+j)$$

Actually, use Fast Fourier Transforms

# Lab test of imaging capability



$R = 300 \text{ cm}$ ,  $f = 30 \text{ cm}$





Neutron image

Three 10-cm cubes of polyethylene, with two Cf-252 sources embedded (courtesy of A. Caffrey, INL)

# Neutron image

20 cm




$R = 300 \text{ cm}$ ,  $f = 30 \text{ cm}$




# Tests in the lab


## Photograph



## Neutron Image




# Tests in the field





Thermal neutron  
image

Spent nuclear fuel storage casks at Idaho National Lab

## SOURCE IN TRUNK OF CAR




## THERMAL NEUTRON IMAGE



## PIXEL INTENSITY HISTOGRAM




# Count rate as a function of distance





# Simple attenuation model for neutron point source in air



Detectors can be scaled up to increase count rates




20 cm x 140 cm

100 cm x 100 cm



# Active interrogation

- A pulsed electron accelerator produces high-energy x-rays (10-MeV) to generate photonuclear reactions
- Nuclear materials will undergo photofission and generate prompt and delayed neutrons
- The delayed neutrons continue to be emitted after each prompt neutron emission





**D.R. Norman, J.L. Jones, K.J. Haskell, P. Vanier and L. Forman,**  
IEEE NSS-MIC Conference Record, October 23-29, 2005

# Active Interrogation with Imaging







D.R. Norman, J.L. Jones, K.J. Haskell,  
P. Vanier and L. Forman,  
IEEE NSS-MIC Conference Record, October, 2005






## Image analysis


- Depleted uranium in polyethylene
    - 6.5-17.5 ms image window
    - 69k neutrons, mean = 72,  $\sigma = 28$
  - Tungsten in polyethylene
    - 6.5-17.5 ms Image window
    - 17k neutrons, mean = 122,  $\sigma = 41$
- 
- Use time gate to distinguish prompt neutrons from delayed fission



# 8-element fast neutron double-scatter spectrometer



# Experimental data, Fast neutron source centered



Plane spacing = 50 cm, Range = 100 cm

# Large area fast-neutron double-scatter directional detector



Area 40 cm x 100 cm  
Modular design is expandable



# CONCLUSIONS

- Directional detection helps find a neutron source in a uniform background
- There are few naturally occurring neutrons
- Ongoing issues
  - Detector size
  - Efficiency
  - Angular resolution
  - Uniformity
  - Gamma rejection
  - Spectroscopy

# Acknowledgement

The BNL Detector Development and Testing Division  
is grateful for continuing support from  
DOE NA-22, DHS and DTRA


# **AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

*Air Commandos*

---



## **Challenges for the Long War**



**Maj Gen Donald Wurster**  
**Vice Commander**

---

***This briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED***



# AFSOC

## America's Specialized Airpower

Air Component to Special Operations







# AFSOC Weapons Systems Overview





# ***Gunship Operations***

## ***Weapon Systems***

---



**AC-130H/U**



# ***Precision requires Training***

---



***“You can run...but you’ll only die tired”***

---



# Precision Fire Support Way Ahead

## Near Term Upgrades:

- 30mm replacing 25mm & 40mm
- Replace ALLTV with GMS2
- Improve UAV collaboration



## Change in Paradigm

- Variable effects (non-lethal to lethal)
  - Higher threat areas
- Multiple, simultaneous targets
  - All-weather, day/night
  - Directed energy





# ***Mobility – Infil / Exfil / Resupply***

## ***Weapon Systems***

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**MC-130E/H/W**



# Fixed Wing Mobility

## Way Ahead

MC-130W



- Increase Commonality
- Center Wing Box Issues
- MC-130W
- SOF Tanker Recap

SOF Tanker



### Recapitalization Requirement

23 X MC-130P Replacements


14 X MC-130E Replacements

12 X SOF Tanker QDR Augments

12 X MC-130W Replacements

61 SOF Tankers

37





# *Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance*




**3<sup>rd</sup> SOS**  
Tactical ISR support of  
Special Operations Forces





# ***Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance***

## **11<sup>th</sup> Intelligence Squadron SOF Dedicated Distributed Ground System**



***“Specialized  
Intel for  
Special  
Operations”***



**Providing Near Real-Time Intelligence  
directly to Operators**





# ***Transformational Mobility***



## **CV-22 Osprey**

- Farther and faster in one period of darkness
- 1<sup>st</sup> CV-22 delivered to Hurlburt in Nov 06



**8 SOS is 1<sup>st</sup> Operational CV-22 Sq**





# *Theater Mobility*

## *Weapon Systems*

**319<sup>th</sup> SOS**

**Tactical in-theater support of  
Special Operations Forces**







# ***Battlefield Airmen***

## *Overview*



**Family of Airmen**  
**Combat Controllers**  
**Combat Weathermen**  
**Pararescuemen**



- Enable Air Power
- Advanced Skills Training
- BAO Kit





# *Highly Trained Personnel*

## *Why We Succeed*

- Highly skilled, mature operators
- Regional orientation, cultural sensitivity, language skills
- Creative and Adaptable
- Small, flexible, joint teams



***“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to have its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”***

**Sir William Francis Butler**





# Aviation Foreign Internal Defense

## Overview



**6 SOS**  
**Assess**  
**Train**  
**Advise**  
**Assist**  
**Integrate**





# ***Current Operations***

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***Our Special Operations Forces are  
the worst nightmare of America's  
worst enemies...***

*President George Bush, June 2004*



# ***A Bad Day to be a Terrorist...***

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







# AFSOC Transformed

*...Joint, Integrated, and Relevant to GWOT*



*“...Our Special Ops, The Worst Nightmare of America’s Worst Enemies” President Bush*